










Title of Document: LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICY 
IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD.   
  
 Gokul C. Iyer, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015 
  
Directed By: Associate Professor Nathan E. Hultman 
School of Public Policy 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that an important element of climate change mitigation policy 
will be the development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. This dissertation uses 
the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), a global integrated assessment model to 
study the relationships between technology and policy in the context of global climate 
change mitigation under three “imperfect” circumstances, namely, constraints on the rate 
of diffusion of low-carbon technologies, countries promoting the deployment of low-
carbon technologies based on national priorities and preferences and variation in 
investment risks across technologies and regions. These conditions deviate from 
conventional idealized assumptions and thus represent an “imperfect” world.  
The first essay shows that factors including social, behavioral and institutional that might 
constrain the rate of diffusion of low-carbon technologies even in the presence of 
favorable climate policies have sizeable impacts on the costs and feasibility of achieving 
stringent climate targets. Such impacts are greatly amplified with major delays in serious 
climate policies.  
The second essay illustrates the divergence between domestic and global outcomes when 
countries promote the deployment of specific low-carbon technologies in the near-term. 
In this essay, I show that a globally cost-effective, near-term international technology 
investment strategy to achieve a long-term climate goal is a diversified international 
technology investment portfolio across countries. This essay also explores the degree to 
which independent national technology deployment policies align with collaboratively 
determined regimes.  I show that conditions exist under which there are substantial gains 
to international cooperation in the development and deployment of diverse low-carbon 
technologies but also circumstances in which domestic outcomes align with the global 
outcome. 
The third essay focuses on the variation of investment risks across technologies and 
regions in the electricity generation sector. I find that by taking into account such 
variation, achieving an emissions mitigation goal is up to 40% higher than it would be in 
a world with uniform investment risks.  Additionally, industrialized countries mitigate 
more and developing countries mitigate less. 
The three essays together underscore the importance of policies aimed at developing 
capabilities and fostering international cooperation in the development and diffusion of 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Climate change is one of the pressing challenges facing the world today. Mitigating 
climate change will require substantial reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in 
all sectors of the global economy (IPCC, 2014). The inter-relationships between 
technology and policy in the context of decadal-scale environmental policy issues such as 
climate change mitigation have received wide attention in the literature (see for example, 
Popp et al. (2010), Gillingham et al. (2008) and Jaffe et al. (2003)). An important lesson 
emerging out of this literature is that efforts to advance the development and diffusion of 
low-carbon technologies will be extremely important. In many cases, long-term 
environmental problems cannot be addressed, or can only be addressed at increased costs, 
using existing technologies (see for example, Clarke et al. (2007)).  
Traditional analyses exploring the relationships between technology and policy in the 
context of global climate change mitigation have largely relied on idealized assumptions 
about technology availability and deployment, regional mitigation efforts and capacities 
to undertake those efforts. For example, most studies that assess the potential of 
accelerated deployment of low-carbon technologies to reduce costs of climate change 
mitigation typically assume that the final portfolio of technologies that gets deployed is 
dependent largely on relative prices. Another frequently made assumption is that 
countries will achieve near-term emissions reductions by employing carbon-price based 
mechanisms. Such assumptions have been very useful to understand the costs and 
patterns of climate change mitigation. However, more recently, a branch of literature that 
aims to understand these relationships under non-idealized or imperfect circumstances 
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has sprung up (see, for example, Clarke et al. (2009) and Edmonds et al. (2008)).  This 
dissertation opens up a dialogue with this relatively new branch of literature and aims to 
better understand the relationships between low-carbon technologies and climate change 
mitigation policy under conditions that deviate from conventional assumptions – in other 
words, under “imperfect” circumstances. The dissertation comprises of three essays, each 
of which focuses on a deviation from commonly made assumptions in assessments of 
emissions mitigation (Table 1-1).1  
Table 1-1 Outline of dissertation 
 
The first essay (Chapter 2) deals with rates of diffusion of low-carbon technologies. Low-
carbon technologies tend to face several economic as well as non-economic constraints to 
their diffusion. Economic constraints are a virtue of the cost of such technologies relative 
to fossil-fuel technologies – low-carbon technologies such as renewables, nuclear and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) are more expensive compared to their fossil-fuel 
counterparts – and that limits the diffusion of such technologies. There are other 
                                                 
1 The three essays that form this dissertation resulted in publications as co-authored journal articles. For 
more details on the contributions of individual authors in each of the essays, see Appendix A.   
Traditional assumptions Deviation considered in this 
dissertation
Essay 1: Low-carbon 
technology diffusion 
rates
Technology deployment depends 
largely on relative prices
Technology diffusion may be 
slowed down by market failures 





Emissions reductions in the near-
term are achieved by means of 
carbon-price based mechanisms
Countries promote the 
deployment of low-carbon 





Capacity to undertake investment 
is uniform throughout the 
economy
Investment risks are non-uniform 




constraints that tend to influence diffusion - for example, market failures.  Market failures 
in technology diffusion are similar to those related to innovation- because the benefits of 
adopting a new technology accrues to society at large, incentives for the adoption of new 
technologies are limited. Likewise, non-market constraints to the adoption of low-carbon 
technologies such as institutional, behavioral, and social factors also influence their rate 
of diffusion (Hultman et al., 2012). In this essay, I review the literature on the sources of 
such diffusion rate constraints, and explore the potential implications of such constraints 
using the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), a global integrated assessment 
model. I find that such constraints may not be critically important without major delays in 
policy action. However, if political action is delayed by a few decades, these constraints 
have greater influence on the costs and feasibility of achieving stringent long-term 
climate targets. The results of this analysis suggest that policies to encourage technology 
deployment and address diffusion constraints, especially in the near-term would play an 
important role in cost-effective climate change mitigation.   
The second essay (Chapter 3) focuses on deployment policies to promote low-carbon 
technologies in the near-term and their relationship with long-term domestic and global 
outcomes. Because climate change is a global problem, there is consensus in the 
international community that efforts to address it must entail some international 
coordination. Indeed, most scholars conclude that a global, economy-wide and long-term 
approach is the most cost-effective method for stabilizing the climate (Jacoby et al., 
2008; Nordhaus, 2005). Previous work has also shown that the economic benefits of such 
an approach are particularly large if stringent climate targets are to be met (Clarke et al., 
2009; Edmonds et al., 2008). While the conventionally idealized world of GHG control is 
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one of seamless regulation that spans all sectors globally, the real world comprises of 
non-uniform, bottom-up efforts. Recent climate change negotiations show that such 
efforts are increasingly being undertaken at regional and national levels based on national 
priorities and preferences. And many countries view promoting the deployment, via 
policy, of low-carbon technologies as an alternative to idealized economy-wide carbon 
prices. For example, China’s recent commitment was to increase the share of non-fossil 
technologies in the energy mix to 20% by 2030 (The White House, 2014). Among several 
motivations for such policies are emissions reductions, energy security, technological 
change and early-mover advantages. This raises the following important question from 
the point of view of the global social planner. What is the most effective mix of near 
country-level deployment policies? Should all countries pursue the same technologies? 
Or, is a diversified approach more effective? The answers to these questions are 
compounded by the fact that technologies have public goods characteristics. For instance, 
technological change that might occur due to domestic deployment policies could spill 
over to firms globally. Therefore, what is cost-effective from the global perspective may 
not be so, from the perspective of the investor countries investing in the deployment 
policies. This essay explores the implications for domestic and global outcomes in the 
long-term when countries promote the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the 
near-term. I show that the globally cost-effective, near-term international technology 
investment strategy to achieve a long-term climate goal is a diversified international 
technology investment portfolio across countries.  In addition, my analysis illustrates that 
conditions exist under which there are substantial gains to international cooperation in the 
development and deployment of different low-carbon technologies but also 
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circumstances in which domestic outcomes align with the global outcome. The results of 
this essay argue for a solid assessment of technologies in question and the scope and 
nature of technological change in policy collaborations aimed at undertaking stringent 
mitigation in the future.  
The third and final essay (Chapter 4) investigates the issue of non-uniform investment 
risks and how such differences affect the costs and geography of emissions mitigation. 
Low-carbon technologies are capital intensive, implying that a transformation to a low-
carbon energy system will require large amounts of capital. A number of factors such as 
national policy environments, quality of public and private institutions, sector and 
technology specific risks, and firm-level characteristics can affect investors’ assessments 
of risks, leading to a wide variation in the business climate for investment. Such variation 
can influence where, how and at what costs firms deploy capital. In this essay, I 
investigate how national institutions affect investment risks and thus the cost of financing 
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Faria and Mauro, 2009; North, 1990). Specifically, I 
investigate the implications of non-uniform investment risks for the costs and patterns of 
mitigation. Using a modified representation of investment risks in the GCAM model, I 
find that emissions mitigation is more expensive in a world with non-uniform investment 
risks than it would be in a world with uniform investment risks.  In addition, 
industrialized countries mitigate more, and developing countries mitigate less. This essay 
introduces a new front in the research on how real-world factors influence climate 
mitigation and suggests that institutional reforms aimed at lowering investment risks 
could be an important element of cost-effective climate mitigation strategies. 
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The final chapter (Chapter 5) concludes with a summary of the dissertation, policy 
implications of the research and future research directions. Not only do the three essays 
together have methodological contributions in providing solid frameworks to incorporate 
real-world factors and policies in assessments related to low-carbon technologies and 
climate change mitigation policy, they also provide valuable insights for domestic and 
international policy. Collectively, the three essays underscore the importance of policies 
aimed at developing capabilities and fostering international cooperation in the 





Chapter 2 Diffusion of low-carbon technologies and the 
feasibility of long-term climate targets 2 
2.1. Introduction 
Addressing the problem of climate change will require dramatic reductions in fossil fuel 
use, enabled by increased efficiency and rapid and sustained global deployment of low-
carbon technologies such as CO2 capture and storage (CCS), nuclear, bioenergy and 
renewables (Clarke et al., 2007). Policy interventions are intended to affect not only the 
portfolio of new technologies that are deployed but also how rapidly and deeply they 
diffuse (Jaffe et al., 2003, 2005). However, the deployment of low-carbon technologies is 
influenced, sometimes strongly, by institutional, behavioral, and social factors, which can 
distort deployment trajectories, even in the presence of ostensibly favorable climate 
change policies (Hultman et al., 2012). In addition to such factors, the deployment of 
low-carbon technologies is also likely to be hampered by the uncertainty in international 
policy response to climate change which imposes new constraints on the diffusion of 
low-carbon technologies. In this essay, I seek to answer the following questions: i.) How 
much do constraints on the diffusion of low-carbon technologies impact the cost and 
feasibility of achieving long-term climate targets? and ii.) How do these impacts change 
in the presence of major delays in global mitigation action?  
Previous studies employing integrated assessment models (IAMs) to explore the role of 
low-carbon technologies have made simple assumptions regarding the availability of 
                                                 
2 This chapter is based on Iyer et al. (2015a) 
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specific technologies.3 For example, some studies have prohibited the construction of 
new capacity for some technologies, such as renewables and nuclear, while others have 
completely excluded technologies (e.g., CCS) or capped their maximum deployment 
(e.g., bioenergy) (Edenhofer et al., 2010; Luderer et al., 2012; Richels et al., 2007; 
Tavoni et al., 2012). This essay contributes to the existing literature on limited 
technology availability by assessing the implications of diffusion constraints for 
achieving stringent mitigation targets. I also add a temporal dimension to the study by 
investigating the implications of constrained diffusion when there are major delays in 
globally coordinated mitigation efforts to address climate change.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I first review the factors that constrain the 
diffusion of low-carbon technologies. Following this, I review the historical diffusion 
rates of technologies in order to provide a background on the notion of “slow” and “fast” 
diffusion. Next, I provide a description of the method and then present the results and 
findings of this study. The final section of this chapter concludes with a summary of the 
findings and scope for future work.  
2.2. Factors constraining the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
An important common finding of several studies in the past is that  accelerated 
technology development offers the potential to reduce costs of achieving stringent 
climate stabilization goals substantially (Clarke et al., 2008; Edenhofer et al., 2010; 
Luderer et al., 2012; McJeon et al., 2011; Richels et al., 2007). Although these studies 
vary in their approaches, they all assume that the final portfolio of technologies is 
                                                 
3 In this essay, and throughout the dissertation, I use a global IAM used for climate policy analysis, namely, 
GCAM. Features of the model are described in Section 2.4.  
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dependent on relative prices. A direct inference of this assumption is therefore, that 
externality pricing and other pricing policies aimed at incentivizing the adoption of low-
carbon technologies would induce profit-oriented firms to use low-carbon technologies 
and thus accelerate their diffusion. However, previous work has shown that while relative 
prices between energy technologies (and therefore, pricing policies) are influential in 
fostering a lower-carbon economy, they alone cannot fully account for the observed 
diffusion of technologies and that several other factors including institutional, behavioral, 
and social factors limit their actual adoption (Box 2-1). In the context of low-carbon 
technologies, the factors that tend to influence diffusion rates of new technologies can be 
grouped under two categories. In the first category are factors that influence the growth 
of low-carbon technologies even in the presence of favorable climate change policy 
environments (such as a price on carbon or a cap-and-trade mechanism).  Examples 
include increasing returns for incumbent technologies, slow response of capital markets 
to the needs of new technologies, lack of adequate institutional and governance structures 
and public perceptions and oppositions. The second set of factors is associated with the 
uncertainty involved in climate change policy. An example is the rational behavior of 
investors under such uncertainty.  
2.2.1. Factors in the presence of favorable climate change policies 
Several characteristics of the energy industry including the market structure and flow of 
information within the industry may constrain the diffusion of new technologies even in 
the presence of favorable climate policies. The value of a new technology to one user 
may depend on how many other users have adopted the technology. In general, new 
adopters will be better off the more other people use the same technology. This benefit 
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associated with the overall scale of technology adoption is referred to as dynamic 
increasing returns (Jaffe et al., 2005). A new technology has to compete with existing 
substitutes that have already been able to undergo a process of increasing returns (Arthur, 
1989). Diffusion of low-carbon technologies may be slowed down because it takes time 
for potential users to get information about the new technology, try it and adapt it to their 
circumstances, leading to slower generation of dynamic increasing returns (Jaffe et al., 
2005).  
Box 2-1 Summary of factors constraining the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
 
One source of increasing returns is the existence of learning economies. Currently 
expensive low-carbon technologies remain expensive because they are not adopted, 
leading to a lock-in of existing carbon-intensive technologies (del Río, 2009). Another 
important contributing factor to dynamic increasing returns is the existence of what is 
called “network externalities” (Jaffe et al., 2005). Network externalities exist when the 
utility derived from a technology  depends on the number of other users of the same or a 
compatible technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). Network externalities can be created by 
Factors in the presence of favorable climate policies
Lack of information about performance of new technologies
Lack of financial support for capital intensive technologies
Preference of risk-averse investors to existing technologies
Public perceptions
Lack of adequate institutional frameworks
Lack of adequate regulations, for e.g. absence of regulations for transport and storage of CO 2
Firm-specific characteristics such as size, ownership
Technology-specific characteristics such as resource availability and intermittency
Factors due to uncertainty in climate change policy
Option value in the presence of uncertainty in carbon prices
High discount rates by investors
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alliances and social networks between firms.  Such networks influence the diffusion of 
new technologies greatly as these are important means for transfer of knowledge and 
spread of information, thereby stimulating mutual dependence between actors and 
reducing the risks of adoption of new technologies (Barreto and Kemp, 2008; Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000; Lin et al., 2009). Firms may therefore decide to delay adoption of a 
new technology until they have information about the experiences of other firms (Nelson, 
1981). Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) identified that the expansion of new technologies is 
slowed down not only when firms are not well connected to other firms with an 
overlapping technology base but also when individual firms are guided by others (i.e., by 
the network) in the wrong direction and/or fail to supply one another with the required 
knowledge. In the case of energy technologies, network externalities are also produced by 
infrastructures. Infrastructures produce externalities that enable compatible technologies 
to diffuse faster than incompatible ones (Grübler, 1997; Grübler et al., 1999). Inter-
dependencies between individual technologies and long-lived infrastructures may also 
impede the development of new technologies which may require new infrastructures. For 
example, nuclear power benefits from an electricity transmission and distribution 
infrastructure that is already largely in place. On the other hand, the development of CCS 
will require significant expansion of CO2 transport infrastructure from the points of 
emission to underground storage sites (Brown et al., 2008).  
Technological inter-dependencies also lead to considerable inertia in technological 
systems. For example, decisions made in the past may lead to technologies getting 
“locked in” to particular configurations because it is difficult to break out of them in a 
short period of time.  Such co-evolution of technology clusters over time, also referred to 
12 
 
as “path dependence” creates constraints for the large scale deployment of new 
technologies (Arthur, 1989; Grübler et al., 1999). Among other sources of lock-ins and 
path dependencies in the energy system are substitutability in the energy sector and 
institutional path dependencies. Substitutability in the energy sector increase lock-in 
effects. As technologies in the energy sector are perfect substitutes, new low-carbon 
technologies can only compete on price and not on “quality”, with fossil-fuel 
technologies (Kalkuhl et al., 2012; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013). In addition, lock-in 
effects are reinforced by co-evolving institutions and regulatory frameworks that form 
what is called the techno-institutional complex (Unruh, 2000). 
A new technology often requires a long period of nurturing and diffusion before it 
achieves a price/performance ratio that makes it attractive to larger segments in the 
market (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). Therefore, financial support, even on the long 
term may be required to ensure deployment of such technologies (Isoard and Soria, 2001; 
Mathews et al., 2010). This is especially true in the case of low-carbon technologies 
because of the intensive upfront capital cost requirement which is different from 
conventional fossil technologies, the cost structures of which rely more on fuel and 
operation costs (Brown et al., 2008). Previous work has shown that lack of adequate 
financial resources is an important problem for setting up low-carbon technologies such 
as renewable energy especially in developing countries (Jagadeesh, 2000). In addition, 
the venture capital market, which sometimes serves as an important source of capital for 
new and risky technologies, is more sensitive to factors beyond the needs of a new 
technological system. Moreover, in a small country, it may be difficult to find highly 
competent and willing venture capitalists domestically, necessitating the need to look for 
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options in the international market and consequently, bring about changes in legislations 
affecting the functioning of capital markets (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000).  
Diffusion rates are also influenced by how risk-averse stakeholders are about technology 
decisions and their preferences for a new technology (Isoard and Soria, 2001; Kemp and 
Volpi, 2008). In a case study of wind energy in Canada, Richards et al. (2012) (Richards 
et al., 2012) found that complacency and preference for status quo were important 
constraints to wind energy development. Lack of experience with new technology, and 
uncertainties related to regulations and various policies (such as taxes and subsidies) 
influence investors’ valuations of risks.  For example, Barradale (2010) demonstrated, on 
the basis of a survey of energy experts, that the boom-bust cycle observed in the 
investment in wind power in the U.S. is caused not by the underlying economics of wind 
but by the negotiation dynamics of power purchase agreements in the face of uncertainty 
regarding federal production tax credit.   
Scholars have noted that public perceptions about the benefits and drawbacks of low-
carbon technologies affect diffusion rates (Montalvo, 2008; West et al., 2010; 
Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). For example, Upreti (2004) observed that because the British 
general public are not much aware of the advantages of biomass energy, they often treat it 
as a dirty source of energy, creating problems for the development of bioenergy in the 
U.K. Likewise, Pickett (2002) observed that although the Japanese government was 
resolute in its commitment to develop a closed nuclear fuel cycle, international security 
concerns over plutonium (which is one of the products of reprocessing) and increasing 
public opposition following a series of nuclear accidents delayed the actual adoption of 
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the technology. Similarly, CCS might experience public opposition as a consequence of 
social concerns about injection and transportation (IEA, 2009; Lilliestam et al., 2012; 
Slagter and Wellenstein, 2011). Political and media support can also influence the 
diffusion rates of new technologies. In a case study of wind energy development in  
Canada, Richards et al. (2012) found that the government’s lack of leadership on 
renewable energy emerged as an important constraint to the diffusion of wind energy.  
Likewise, Walker (2000) observed that technology lock-in effects got reinforced in the 
case of the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant in the U.K. because the close nexus 
between industrial and political actors prevented markets and democratic processes from 
operating effectively. Along similar lines, Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) studied the 
diffusion of renewable energy in Germany and argued that establishment of some of the 
elements of an advocacy coalition by firms was an important driver in the initial period of 
technological development.  
Previous work has also shown that lack of adequate institutional frameworks constrains 
the diffusion of low-carbon technologies such as renewables, especially in developing 
countries (Jagadeesh, 2000). In spite of the presence of conducive policy environments, 
government involvement and the type of governance may hinder the diffusion process. 
For example, Burer & Wustenhagen  (2009) surveyed professionals from European and 
North American venture capital and private equity funds and found that although 
experienced investors consider conducive policy environments as an important way to 
encourage investment in low-carbon technologies, some investors were deeply skeptical 
about government involvement in any form. This view may be a factor that hampers their 
entry into new and emerging sectors.  
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Legislation may bias the choice of technology in favor of the incumbent technology 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). For example, Mitchell and Connor (2004) argued that the 
UK’s New Electricity Trading Arrangements was “technology and fuel blind” and 
promoted incumbent technologies over renewables.  Similarly, inadequate regulatory 
frameworks for nuclear waste management, reactor safety and risks of nuclear 
proliferation serve as important barriers for the diffusion of nuclear energy (van der 
Zwaan, 2002). 4  Likewise, the absence of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks 
for the transport and geological storage of CO2 are likely to impede commercial 
deployment of CCS (Gibbins and Chalmers, 2008; IEA, 2009). Along similar lines, high 
intellectual property transaction costs, techniques such as patent warehousing and weak 
or nonexistent patent protection in developing countries are likely to impede the diffusion 
of low-carbon technologies (Brown et al., 2008).  
Characteristics of the individual firms that adopt a new technology also affect its 
diffusion rate. Rose and Joskow (1990) found that large firms and investor-owned 
electric utilities are likely to adopt new technologies earlier than their smaller and 
publicly-owned counterparts. Likewise, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) found that 
because investor-owned and publicly-owned utilities in the U.S. respond to different type 
of stakeholders and have different capabilities, investor-owned electric utilities respond 
more to the implementation of policies such as renewable portfolio standards than do 
publicly-owned utilities. Scholars have also emphasized that the adoption of low-carbon 
technologies by a firm depends on its physical capacity to adopt the technology and the 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion on issues surrounding nuclear technologies, see (Iyer et al., 2014) 
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timing of investments with respect to other business cycles (Kemp and Volpi, 2008; 
Montalvo, 2008; Nelson, 1981).  
Apart from the above, specific low-carbon technologies face special constraints that 
might hinder their adoption. For example, successful implementation of renewable 
technologies such as wind and solar depend on the availability of natural capital, defined 
by Daly (1996) as “the stock that yields the flow of natural resources”. Russo (2003) also 
argued that natural capital such as wind and solar are geographic site specific i.e. it is 
difficult to move the capital around.  Additionally, Sovacool (2009) (Sovacool, 2009) 
observed that according to various stakeholders, intermittency, forecasting complexity, 
need for backup electricity, and the distance of generating sources from the grid act as 
serious obstacles to the wide deployment of renewables in the United States. Technical 
barriers such as high energy penalty and the consequences of injection under high 
pressure (e.g. phase change of CO2 during injection) impose special constraints on the 
deployment of CCS (Slagter and Wellenstein, 2011).  
2.2.2. Factors due to uncertainty in climate change policy 
In the context of climate change, there are large uncertainties surrounding future impacts 
of climate change, the time and magnitude of policy response, and thus the likely returns 
to R&D investment (Jaffe et al., 2005). International negotiations are moving slowly and 
may prove inadequate over the next several decades (Jakob et al., 2012; Weyant, 2011). 
Unless externalities from conventional electricity production are internalized, price 
distortion will be an important obstacle for the diffusion of low-carbon technologies 
(Jaffe et al., 2002; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). Uncertainty in climate change policy creates 
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uncertainty in the price of carbon and thus affects the valuations of the costs of 
externalities.  This creates several barriers to the diffusion of low-carbon technologies as 
explained below. 
Uncertainty in the price of carbon induces an “option value” of postponing the adoption 
of new technology to the future (Clarke and Weyant, 2002; Jaffe et al., 2002; Stoneman 
and Diederen, 1994). From the perspective of an investor, there may be a benefit of 
delaying an investment, which occurs as new information (e.g., performance, cost, 
market demand, substitutes and policy signals) is incorporated into the decision making.  
This benefit needs to be compared with the benefit of exercising the option, which 
includes the earlier earnings from the investment and the ability of extracting more rents 
from competitors. Under uncertainty, an investment will be postponed until a certain 
threshold for new information is reached (Dixit, 1994). The adoption is likely to be 
delayed even further if the firm has optimistic expectations regarding technological 
improvements or price reductions (Stoneman and Diederen, 1994) or pessimistic 
expectations about policy signals. Another incentive to delay adoption under policy 
uncertainty occurs when the firm is large enough to meaningfully affect policy via 
coalition building (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).   
Uncertainty in climate policy also contributes to the valuations of risk by investors. High 
discount rates, and the resulting under-valuing of long term benefits of high political and 
capital investments in environmental reform are likely to discourage necessary 
investments to advance alternative options (Jaffe et al., 2005; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). 
For example, Fuss et al. (2012) showed that several uncertainties including those related 
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to climate sensitivity, international commitments to specific targets and the stability of 
CO2  prices impact the behavior of risk-averse and risk-neutral investors.  
Combinations of the factors outlined above serve to slow down the diffusion of new 
technologies. The multi-level perspective on technological transitions can be used to 
understand how these different factors influence the overall technological transformation 
process and in particular, technology diffusion. According to this framework, 
technological transitions take place in a “socio-technical landscape” where the factors 
such as those outlined above bring about changes in user practices, regulation, industrial 
networks, infrastructure, symbolic meanings, etc. These changes create pressure on the 
linkages between social groups (known as the “socio-technical regime”) that enable 
radical novelties – that are not affected by market forces– to create new linkages at the 
regime as well as the landscape levels. These changes usually take place slowly and tend 
to slow down the overall transition process (Geels, 2002; Geels and Schot, 2007; Rip and 
Kemp, 1998). 
In the following section, I compile historical diffusion rates of various technologies to 
provide a background on the notion of “slow” and “fast” diffusion. 
2.3. Historical diffusion rates of energy technologies 
It is useful to study historical dynamics of technologies in the energy sector to understand 
the notion of “slow” and “fast” diffusion. Kramer and Haigh (2009) postulated two laws 
for transitions in the global energy sector based on the growth of energy technologies in 
the twentieth century. First, when technologies are new, they go through a few decades of 
exponential growth with an average growth rate of 26% per annum until the technology 
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“materializes” i.e. it becomes around 1% of world energy. Second, once the technologies 
“materialize”, growth changes to linear as the technology settles at a market share.  
A number of studies in the past have investigated the historical growth of technologies 
and dynamics of technological transitions in the energy system (Fouquet and Pearson, 
2006; Grübler et al., 1999; Hook et al., 2012; Wilson and Grübler, 2011; Wilson et al., 
2012). I compile the diffusion rates for different technological transformations from these 
studies in Table 2-1. The above studies have used two types of metrics to analyze the 
dynamics of growth. In the first metric used by Hook et al. (2012), growth is defined as 
the percentage change from one point in time to the next. They showed that the annual 
diffusion rate of a technology is inversely proportional to the size of the output. In the 
second metric used by Grübler et al. (1999), (Wilson et al., 2012) and Wilson and 
Grübler (2011), historical growths of technologies are modeled as logistic (S-shaped) 
growth functions. These studies assume the following typology of diffusion. Once a new 
technology is developed and demonstrated, it is introduced in niche markets where it has 
substantial performance advantages over existing technologies. During this phase, the 
technology achieves commercial market shares up to 5%.  This is followed by extensive 
use in a wider array of markets, known as “pervasive diffusion” wherein market shares 
rise rapidly before they saturate when these markets are exhausted (Grübler et al., 1999).  
The time ∆t required for the technologies to grow from 10% to 90% of the market is then 
used to describe the development of technologies over time. In the current study, I use the 
first metric, namely, the one used by (Hook et al., 2012). As I will explain in the 
following section, this enables me to specify future growth trajectories, simply, in terms 
of various annual growth percentages from existing levels of output. In order to express 
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the findings of Grübler et al. (1999), Wilson and Grübler (2011) and Wilson et al. (2012) 
in terms of annual percentage growth, I assume that the growths of technologies during 
the period when their outputs are between 10% and 90% of the asymptotes of the S-
curves are linear (in line with the second “law” of the growth of energy technologies 
postulated by Kramer and Haigh (2009)). Using the mathematical definition of diffusion 
rate provided by (Hook et al., 2012), the average annual diffusion rate in percentage 
during this period can be shown to be equal to 219.7/∆t (see Appendix B for a derivation 
of this result).  
A look at the historical diffusion rates compiled in Table 2-1 shows that most 
technological transitions have happened at low rates. Fossil fuel energy has grown at less 
than 10% per year. Even during the oil boom and the dramatic rise in global oil use, 
annual average diffusion rates of energy output from petroleum were about 7%.  In 
contrast, hydropower and biomass energy have grown at even lower rates. Energy 
intensive technologies such as railways and aircrafts have grown at around 4% per year. 
Note that most of the annual average diffusion rates presented in Table 2-1 are based on 
long time horizons, as high as 100 years for some cases and reflect growth during the 
“pervasive diffusion” phase explained earlier - they indicate, in most cases, the average 
diffusion rates at which technologies grew from 10% to 90% of their market shares. Not 
only did diffusion rates vary widely during these periods, they were very different during 
the market introduction and saturation phases. For example, nuclear energy grew at high 
rates over 25% per year until the Chernobyl accident in 1985, after which diffusion rates 
diminished significantly to as low as 1-2% during the 2000’s (Hook et al., 2012; Wilson 
et al., 2012). In the case of fossil fuels, high diffusion rates of 20–30% occurred in the 
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nineteenth century when the fossil energy industry was young. The two World Wars and 
the Great Depression of the 1930s reduced growth for some time. During the post-World 
War economic boom, fossil fuel energy production grew at over 5% annually but this 
decreased to about 2% by the 1980s. Diffusion rates of fossil fuel energy diminished in 
spite of technological breakthroughs in petroleum exploration and extraction, coal mining 
and similar disciplines because of a number of reasons including emergence of substitutes 
and a social disinclination toward dependence on fossil fuels (Hook et al., 2012).  
In addition to the technologies reviewed in Table 2-1, Wilson and Grübler (2011) studied 
the patterns and characteristics of two important energy transitions since the Industrial 
Revolution namely, the emergence of steam power relying on coal and the displacement 
of the previously dominating coal-based steam technology by electricity. They found that 
it takes 8 to13 decades for new energy technology clusters to achieve market dominance 
at the global scale; corresponding to an average annual growth of only 2-3% per year. If 
the entire technology life cycle from first introduction to market maturity is considered, it 









Table 2-1 Historical diffusion rates of various technologies surveyed in literature 
 
In contrast, environmental pollution control technologies such as flue gas desulfurization 
(FGD) systems have grown at faster rates. The development of such technologies is 
different because the market stimulated by government regulation was primarily 
responsible for their rapid diffusion.  For example, in the 1970s, the stringency of the 










Bioenergy Global 2% (Hook et al., 2012)
Coal (as a substitute for traditional energy) Global 2% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Coal (as a substitute for  traditional energy) USA 3% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Open-hearth steelmaking  Global 3% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Cars Global 3% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Railways  Global 4% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Aircrafts Global 4% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Steam ships (as substitutes for sail ships) Global 4% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Open-hearth steelmaking  USA 4% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Railways  France 5% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Electrification of homes  USA 5% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Coal power Global 5% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Oil refineries Global 6% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Oil energy Global 7% (Hook et al., 2012)
Natural gas power Global 7% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Hydropower Global <8% (Hook et al., 2012)
Mechanization in coal mining  Russia 8% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Railway track electrification  Russia 8% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Air in intercity travel (as a substitute for rail) USA 8% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Chemical preservation of railway ties  USA 8% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Percentage of households with radio  USA 9% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Basic oxygen furnace  Global 9% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Coal and Gas energy Global 5-10% (Hook et al., 2012)
Basic oxygen steel furnace  USA 11% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Nuclear energy Global 11% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Air conditioners in homes  Japan 12% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Car air conditioners  USA 12% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Automobiles (as a substitute for carriages) UK 14% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Cars (as a substitute for horses) UK and France 14% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Cars (as a substitute for horses) France 15% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Transistors in radios (as a substitute for vacuum tubes) USA 15% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Color TV (as a substitute for Black and white TV) USA 15% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Flue gas Desulfurization USA 15% (Taylor et al., 2005)
Compact fluorescent lamps Japan 15% (Wilson et al., 2012)
Cars (as a substitute for horses) USA 18% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Locomotives  USA, Russia and UK 18% (Grübler et al., 1999)
Wind energy Denmark 20% (Wilson et al., 2012)







tight deadline for attainment of primary SO2 emissions standards provided an important 
incentive for the development of FGD technology in the U.S (Taylor et al., 2005). These 
systems have grown at roughly 15% per year.  
In subsequent analyses, I specify low, medium and high diffusion rate constraints 
(consistent with the above review) on the diffusion of low-carbon technologies.    
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. The GCAM integrated assessment model 
In this and the following essays, I use the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) to 
answer the research questions. GCAM combines partial equilibrium economic models of 
the global energy system and global land use with a reduced-form climate model, the 
Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) 
(Edmonds et al., 2004; Edmonds and Reilly, 1985; Kim et al., 2006; Sands and 
Leimbach, 2003). Assumptions about population growth, labor participation rates and 
labor productivity in 14 geo-political regions, as well as assumptions about resources and 
energy and agricultural technologies, drive the outcomes of GCAM. GCAM operates in 5 
year time periods from 2005 (calibration year) to 2095 by solving for the equilibrium 
prices and quantities of various energy, agricultural and GHG markets in each time 
period and in each region. GCAM is a dynamic-recursive model in which decisions are 
made on the basis of current prices alone. GHG emissions are determined endogenously 
based on the resulting energy, agriculture, and land use systems. GHG concentrations, 
radiative forcing, and global temperature change are determined using MAGICC. 
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The energy system in GCAM comprises of detailed representations of extractions of 
depletable primary resources such as coal, natural gas, oil and uranium along with 
renewable sources such as solar and wind (at regional levels). GCAM also includes 
representations of the processes that transform these resources to final energy carriers 
which are ultimately used to deliver goods and services demanded by end users. Each 
technology in the model has a lifetime, and once invested, technologies operate till the 
end of their lifetime or are shut down if the average variable cost exceeds the market 
price. The deployment of technologies in GCAM depends on relative costs and is 
achieved using a logit-choice formulation which is designed to represent decision making 
among competing options when only some characteristics of the options can be observed 
(Clarke and Edmonds, 1993; McFadden, 1980; Train, 1993). An important feature of this 
approach is that not all decision makers choose the same technology option just because 
its observed price is lower than all competing technologies; higher-priced options may 
take some market share. A detailed description of how the energy system is represented 
in GCAM is available in (Clarke et al., 2008).  
2.4.2. Representation of diffusion constraints 
In this essay, I employ a version of GCAM that imposes explicit diffusion rate constraints 
on top of the current technology choice framework. The constraints take the following 
simple form: 
𝑥𝑖(𝑡) =  𝑥𝑖(𝑡0)  ×  (1 + 𝛽)
(𝑡−𝑡0) 
where 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) represents the deployment of a technology i at time t,  𝛽 is the rate of 
diffusion of technology i in percentage points per year and 𝑥𝑖(𝑡0) is the deployment of 
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technology i in the initial period 𝑡0. As I explain later, the constraint may be binding or 
non-binding. If the constraint is non-binding, the deployment in time period t is assumed 
to be equal to the value without constraints. GCAM solves the above constraint by 
introducing an “adjustment cost” to the cost of the technology. The adjustment cost is 
changed iteratively until the constraint is satisfied. Adjustment costs can be understood as 
a proxy for the all the factors that constrain the diffusion of the technology in question.  
The above stylized representation of technology diffusion serves two purposes. First, it is 
simple and enables me to treat technology diffusion as an input-output process. The 
assumption here is that a number of factors constrain technology diffusion and 𝛽 
represents the sum total of those effects. Second, by changing just one parameter, 
namely, 𝛽, I can explore the implications of slow diffusion rates for the costs and 
feasibilities of achieving stringent climate targets. As I explain in the following section, I 
specify low, medium and high diffusion rate constraints based on the review in Table 2-1. 
It is important to clarify that historical technological transitions may not provide 
sufficient guidance on how technologies will evolve in the future.  As noted by Fouquet 
and Pearson (2006), using past trends to anticipate future developments is risky: it may 
be appropriate, if we are in a period of technological lock-ins, or erroneous, if new 
technologies, fuels, networks and policies are likely to develop. In this essay, I use 
historical diffusion rates only as guidance or reference points to understand “slow” and 
“fast” diffusion in a much broader sense.  
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2.4.3. Scenario setting 
To help answer my questions, I explore a number of scenarios using GCAM. Scenario 
analysis is a well-established analytical tool to investigate complex interrelationships of a 
large numbers of variables and for making decisions under uncertainty (Clarke et al., 
2008). It is important to note that scenarios are not predictions; rather, they are sketches 
of alternative future conditions. Scenario analysis has been used extensively in the 
climate change context, for e.g. studies of the Energy Modeling Forum (Clarke et al., 
2009). 
In this study, scenarios vary across four dimensions: the climate target, technologies that 
are constrained, diffusion rates for the constrained technologies and the length of delays 
in globally coordinated mitigation action. I impose two long-term climate targets 
corresponding to 450 and 550 ppm CO2e by the end of the century. These targets are 
associated with limiting global mean temperature rise to less than 2°C and 3°C 
respectively, targets endorsed by the UNFCCC in the Copenhagen Accord, in order to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 2010; 
Vuuren et al., 2011). Diffusion constraints are specified for major low-carbon 
technologies—nuclear, CCS, renewables (solar and wind) and bioenergy in the electricity 
sector.5 These low-carbon technologies still need to be economically attractive relative to 
other technologies, but the diffusion constraints limit how quickly they enter the energy 
system. The diffusion of these technologies are constrained individually as well as jointly 
(renewables and bioenergy; nuclear and CCS; nuclear, CCS, renewables and bioenergy). 
Constraints on the diffusion of the low-carbon technologies are represented as fixed 
                                                 
5 In this essay, I restrict the analysis to supply-side electricity generation technologies. 
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annual rates of growth of net technology deployment. While constraints on the diffusion 
of nuclear, CCS and renewables are imposed at the regional level, those for bioenergy are 
specified at the global level. I specify three levels of diffusion rate constraints at 5% 
(low), 10% (medium), and 15% (high) per year. The review of diffusion rates in Table 2-
1 can be used as reference points to help understand how to think of these numbers. For 
instance, the low diffusion rate of 5% per year is similar to the historical diffusion rates 
of coal power (1959-1999) and oil refineries (1950-1984) (Wilson et al., 2012).  
Likewise, the medium diffusion rate of 10% per year is comparable to the historical 
growths of nuclear energy (1974-1992). And finally the high diffusion rate constraint of 
15% per year is close to the historical growths of CFLs (1994-2003) and FGD systems 
(1978-2000) (Taylor et al., 2005). Finally, I consider delays of 0, 10, 20 and 30 years 
from 2020. Thus, globally coordinated mitigation action (i.e. the first year in which a 
carbon price is introduced in the model) is assumed to begin from 2020, 2030, 2040 and 
2050. The delayed scenarios follow the baseline until the year in which mitigation begins. 
Combinations of these variables give rise to a total of 176 scenarios (see Table 2-2 for the 





2.5. Results and discussion 
2.5.1. Pathways toward 450 and 550ppm CO2e without explicit constraints on 
technology diffusion 
Without constraints on the deployment of low-carbon technologies, CO2 emissions 
pathways achieving 450 and 550 ppm targets peak around 2035 and 2040, respectively, 
and start to decline, exhibiting substantial negative emissions by the end of the century 
(Figure 2-1 A). Delays in policy action extend the period of growing CO2 emissions, 
followed by more dramatic emissions mitigation, eventually generating greater negative 
emissions by the end of the century compared to the case without delays. Nevertheless, a 
large part of the catch-up in emissions mitigation after the delays takes place within about 
10 years. The relative degrees of mitigation effort can be seen in terms of carbon price 
paths, which rise exponentially following the Hotelling-Peck-Wan rule (Peck and Wan, 
1996). The 450 ppm target demands higher carbon price than the 550 ppm target (Figure 
2-1 B). The rapid catch-up in emissions mitigation with delays lead to increases in carbon 








Table 2-2 Feasibility of achieving targets under constraints on the diffusion of low-
carbon technologies and delays in policy action a 
 
a Values in the table are CO2 prices  in 2050 in 2010 USD/tCO2. Shaded cells with an ‘X’ 




















None - 48 49 52 56 71 74 78 88
High 48 49 52 57 71 74 78 88
Medium 48 49 53 57 72 75 80 89
Low 48 50 54 58 73 75 80 90
High 48 50 53 58 71 75 80 89
Medium 49 50 53 58 71 75 80 89
Low 50 50 55 59 73 77 83 91
High 48 49 53 58 73 76 80 91
Medium 49 50 54 59 76 79 83 95
Low 55 56 58 64 85 88 93 X
High 49 51 53 59 74 76 83 90
Medium 50 52 55 61 75 79 83 92
Low 52 53 57 61 76 79 85 X
High 49 51 54 59 74 78 83 91
Medium 51 52 56 61 75 79 83 92
Low 51 53 57 61 76 79 85 X
High 48 50 53 58 73 76 82 91
Medium 49 50 54 61 77 79 X X
Low 57 59 62 67 90 X X X
High 50 51 54 59 74 78 83 91
Medium 53 55 59 65 83 X X X
















Figure 2-1 A.) Fossil fuel and industry emissions and B.) CO2 prices in scenarios 
under unconstrained diffusion of low-carbon technologies. Under stringent climate 
targets, CO2 emissions peak in the medium-term and then start to decline, exhibiting 
substantial negative emissions by the end of the century. In the presence of delays in 
globally coordinated action, there are more negative emissions in the long-term. In 
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Due to higher carbon prices, the net present value (NPV) of mitigation costs (throughout 
this essay, I assume a discount rate of 5%) of stabilizing the climate increases with the 
number of years of delay in climate policies, although the impact is not particularly large 
(Figure 2-2).6 In addition, delayed action requires faster emissions mitigation after the 
peak and that is costly. This is consistent with findings of previous studies on the effects 
of delayed action (Bosetti et al., 2009a; Calvin et al., 2009; Jakob et al., 2012). A delay of 
30 years increases the mitigation costs for 450 ppm and 550 ppm targets by 18% and 
15% respectively.  Note also that the mitigation costs of stabilizing the climate increase 
with the year of delay in a convex manner, and the convexity is greater for 450 ppm 
targets. That is, delays in climate policies require increasingly rapid transitions when the 
policy regime is strengthened, and the required transitions become even more rapid for a 
more stringent climate stabilization target.   
The general behavior of modest near-term mitigation followed by dramatic long-term 
mitigation mainly originates from the presence of low-carbon technologies, such as 
renewables, nuclear, and most importantly, bioenergy in combination with CCS 
technologies (bio-CCS), which are deployed on a large scale over the second half of the 
century. This is especially true in the presence of delays in policy action (Figure 2-3). In 
particular, bio-CCS, which generates net negative emissions, offers considerable 
flexibility in the timing of mitigation action, leading to a major part of emissions 
mitigation being conducted in the long-term.  
                                                 
6 Standard metrics of mitigation cost include GDP loss, consumption loss, the area under the marginal 
abatement cost curve, and compensated variation and equivalent variation of consumer welfare loss. In this 
study, mitigation costs are calculated as the area under the marginal abatement cost curve. This measures 
the loss in both consumer and producer surplus plus the tax revenue under a carbon policy but not the 





Figure 2-2 NPV of mitigation costs under unconstrained diffusion but with delays in 
policy action. The numbers above each data point show the percentage increase with 
respect to the no delay case. Mitigation costs with delays in globally coordinated action 
are higher.  
Technology diffusion rates decrease with time, as the size of deployment increases 
because of increasing market competition to satisfy a finite demand (Figure 2-4). The 
scenarios without explicit technology diffusion constraints indicate that the low, medium 
and high diffusion rate constraints (5%, 10% and 15% per year) that are imposed on the 
low-carbon technologies may or may not be binding. Without any delays, nuclear power 
and bioenergy diffusion rates are modest, and hence the constraints would be binding 
only for brief periods of time. This is because, nuclear power is relatively mature in its 
stage of development and the development of bioenergy is limited by competition of land 
use with crop lands and forests that becomes increasingly intense under a carbon price 
regime. In contrast, the constraints could limit the diffusion of relatively new 
technologies, such as renewables and CCS, mostly during the first half of the century. In 
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all scenarios, for example, the up-scaling of wind power will be limited by both the 
medium (10% per year) and the low constraints (5% per year) until the middle of the 
century. However, the high constraint (15% per year) will remain non-binding throughout 
the century. Solar power shows rapid near-term diffusion, making even the high 
constraint (15% per year) binding through 2025, followed by a continued decrease in its 
diffusion rate, leaving even the low constraint (5% per year) non-binding beyond 2060. 
Similarly, CCS technology, after its introduction as early as in 2020, expands very 
rapidly through 2025 (much greater than 15% per year), followed by a continued 
decrease in diffusion rate with less than 5% growth after 2065.  
With delays in climate policy action and no diffusion constraints, low-carbon 
technologies grow at the same rates as the baseline case until the globally harmonized 
carbon price is imposed (Figure 2-4). In this year these technologies are introduced on a 
large scale, exhibiting major spikes in diffusion rates. Interestingly, the accelerated 
deployment due to delays in policy action spans over the 5-10 year time frame. The 
varying degrees to which diffusion constraints limit the deployment of low-carbon 
technologies may translate into varying opportunity costs of having barriers to 
technology diffusion with or without delays in policy action. These interesting dynamics 






Figure 2-3 Primary energy by fuel under unconstrained diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies. Low-carbon technologies, such as renewables, nuclear, and bioenergy in 
combination with CCS technologies (bio-CCS), are deployed on a large scale over the 
second half of the century, especially when globally coordinated action is delayed by 
several decades.       
2.5.2. The effect of diffusion constraints  
Constraints on the diffusion of all low-carbon technologies considered in this study have 
the effect of postponing mitigation; resulting in slower introduction of renewables and 
CCS until the mid-century and faster deployment of bio-CCS and nuclear power 
thereafter (Figure 2-5). In the first half of the century, diffusion constraints limit the 
optimal deployment of renewables and CCS technologies, leading to reduction in energy 
consumption. During this period, conventional fossil fuel and bioenergy, which remain 
non-binding, continue to get deployed. In the latter half of the century, CCS technologies 
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are rapidly installed, as diffusion constraints are no longer binding in most regions, 
especially for the production of electricity from biomass, the diffusion of which has 
remained unconstrained anyway. The residual energy demand is fulfilled by faster up-
scaling of nuclear power, which is cheaper to be integrated to the system than 
renewables. Such changes in the energy system result in higher carbon prices and 
mitigation costs in scenarios with diffusion constraints compared to the case without 
constraints. 
In a broader sense, whether or not low-carbon technologies are available on a large scale 
at the right timing will influence the efficient pathway of emissions mitigation, raising the 
level of carbon prices. Constraining the deployment of low-carbon technologies that 
would play a major role in the mid-century, for example renewables, would delay 
emissions mitigation (as shown by the lower emissions in the long-term compared to the 
unconstrained case in Figure 2-6 A). In this case, greater and cheaper mitigation can be 
done later in the century using bio-CCS (Figure 2-6 B). Similarly, if the low-carbon 
technologies that would play an important role in the long-term are severely limited, for 
example CCS (which would constrain the deployment of bio-CCS), greater mitigation in 
the near term would be required (as shown by the lower emissions in the near-term 




Figure 2-4 Annual diffusion rates of low-carbon technologies under different long-
term stabilization targets (450 ppm with and without delays in policy action and 550 
ppm without delays) and unconstrained diffusion of low-carbon technologies. With 
delays in climate policy action, low-carbon technologies grow at the same rates as the 
baseline case until the globally harmonized carbon price is imposed. In this year these 






Figure 2-5 Change in primary energy consumption by fuel for the 450 ppm target with 
constraints on the diffusion of nuclear, bioenergy, renewables and CCS at medium 
rates (10% per year), without delay in policy action, relative to the case without 
diffusion constraints. In the presence of diffusion constraints, the deployments of 
renewables and CCS are slowed down until the mid-century. Thereafter, the 
deployments of bio-CCS and nuclear power are sped up. 
The departure from the optimal schedule of technology deployment due to factors that 
constrain their diffusion has the effect of raising mitigation costs (Figure 2-7). The cost of 
limited technology diffusion varies substantially across the type of technologies that are 
constrained and the availability of technology substitutes that could be deployed on a 
larger scale. Diffusion constraints on CCS and renewables have the largest impact. This 
is because, if not constrained, these technologies would have the greatest potential to 
contribute to the de-carbonization of the global energy system with rapid up-scaling. 
Diffusion constraints on bioenergy and nuclear power are not as expensive because they 
remain largely nonbinding throughout the century in most regions. In addition, the 
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responsiveness of mitigation costs to diffusion rates varies across the type of technologies 
that are constrained. For example, the costs of achieving the 450 ppm target with the low 
diffusion rate constraint (5% per year) for CCS or renewables are 16% and 13% higher, 
respectively, than the cases with the high diffusion rate constraint (15% per year). In 
comparison, the cost of achieving the same target with the low diffusion rate for nuclear 
power is only 3% higher. The relatively higher cost increase in the case with constrained 
CCS is due to the decreased opportunity of negative emissions from bio-CCS in the 
second half of the century, requiring more drastic, immediate mitigation action in the 
near term, which is costly. When nuclear power and CCS are jointly constrained, the 
mitigation cost with the low diffusion rate is 28% higher than the case with the high rate, 
as these technologies no longer serve as substitutes. Note that diffusion constraints 
themselves could have impacts on the mitigation cost as large as several decades of 




Figure 2-6 A.) CO2 emissions pathways and B.) Cumulative CO2 removal (2020-2095) 
based on bio-CCS under constrained diffusion of CCS and renewables. Constraining 
the diffusion of renewables would delay emissions mitigation. In this case, more bio-
CCS would get deployed in the latter half of the century. On the other hand, if the 
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Figure 2-7 NPV of 2020-2095 mitigation costs under diffusion constraints on low-
carbon technologies and no delay in action for A.) 550 ppm CO2e target and B.) 450 
CO2e target. An “X” indicates an infeasible scenario. In the presence of constraints to 
the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, mitigation costs of achieving stringent 
climate goals are higher. When all low-carbon technologies are jointly constrained at 
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Constraints on the diffusion of low-carbon technologies also influence feasibilities. Both 
the stabilization targets can be achieved even when the deployments of nuclear and CCS 
or renewables and bioenergy are jointly constrained at any level. When all of the 
technologies are constrained at the 5% per year rate, however, achieving the 450 ppm 
target becomes infeasible. Infeasibility can be thought of as excessively high mitigation 
costs, where a large part of the mitigation needs to come from immediate and drastic 
reductions in energy demand rather than from supply-side transformation.  
2.5.3. The effect of diffusion constraints with delayed action 
Delays in policy action mean that the transition to a low-carbon energy system must be 
more rapid once climate policy comes into play. As a result, larger diffusion rates will be 
required and we expect to see higher mitigation costs and even infeasibilities with 
diffusion constraints on top of delays. Delays in policy action in addition to diffusion 
constraints exaggerate the dynamics observed earlier once the policy regime is 
strengthened. For example, when all low-carbon technologies are constrained at high 
rates (15% per year) along with a delay in policy action of 30 years, the energy system 
becomes more carbon intensive (more emitting sources and less renewable sources) than 
the unconstrained case through the year 2050 in which a price on carbon is first applied 
(Figure 2-8 A). During this period, energy consumption becomes higher than the 
unconstrained case due to lower energy prices. Beyond 2050, however, there is drastic 






Figure 2-8 Change in primary energy consumption by fuel for a 450 ppm CO2e target 
with constraints on the diffusion of nuclear, bioenergy, renewables and CCS at the 
high diffusion rate (15% per year) along with a 30 year delay in policy action, relative 
to A.) the unconstrained case without delay  and B.) the case with the same constraints 





Also, as the diffusion constraints in this scenario are mostly non-binding, immediate 
ramp-up of bio-CCS (aided by a high price on carbon) and accelerated nuclear power 
diffusion help in achieving the climate target. In addition, because of the largely non-
binding constraints, most of the changes described above occur because of the delay 
(Figure 2-8 B). 
Mitigation costs increase convexly with number of years of delay in policy action as in 
the case without diffusion constraints (Figures 2-2 & 2-9). However, the relative increase 
in costs with delay (in other words, the responsiveness of the costs to delays in policy 
action) increases in the scenarios with diffusion constraints. For example, in the 
unconstrained case, a delay of 30 years increases the mitigation cost of achieving the 550 
ppm target by 15% (Figure 2-2). In contrast, when the diffusion of bioenergy, nuclear, or 
renewables are constrained at the medium diffusion rate, a delay of 30 years increases the 
mitigation costs by 14-18%. Likewise, under the same climate target, when the diffusion 
of CCS technologies are constrained at medium rates, a 30-year delay increases the 
mitigation cost by as much as 25%.  This is because the large-scale availability of low-






Figure 2-9 NPV of mitigation costs up to 2095 under the medium diffusion rate 
constraint on the diffusion of individual low-carbon technologies and delays in policy 
action for A.) 550 ppm CO2e and B.) 450 ppm CO2e targets. In the presence of delays, 
mitigation costs are higher. 
Delays in policy action influence the effect of diffusion constraints on mitigation costs 
substantially especially when low-carbon technologies are jointly constrained (Figure 
2-10). For example, the mitigation cost for the 550 ppm target under the low diffusion 
rate constraint on the diffusion of renewables and bioenergy is 16% higher than the 
unconstrained case. On the other hand, with a 30 year delay, the mitigation cost is 21% 
higher compared to the unconstrained case with the same delay. Delays also influence the 
responsiveness of costs to different levels of diffusion constraints. For example, with no 
  
No delay 10 year delay 20 year delay 30 year delay
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delay, the mitigation cost of achieving the 550 ppm target with the low diffusion rate on 
renewables and bioenergy is 11% higher than the case with the high diffusion rate 
constraint. However, with a 30 year delay, this increases to 17%. 
Achieving stringent climate targets under diffusion constraints becomes challenging with 
delays in policy action. When the diffusion of CCS or renewables is constrained at the 
low diffusion rate constraint, achieving the 450 ppm target with a 30 year delay becomes 
infeasible. Infeasibilities increase when a particular set of technologies are jointly 
constrained. When the diffusion of all low-carbon technologies are constrained at the 
medium diffusion rate constraint, achieving a 450 ppm target with a delay of only 10 
years or more becomes infeasible. While achieving the 550 ppm target under the low 
diffusion rate constraint is feasible up to a delay in action of 10 years, achieving the 450 
ppm target becomes infeasible even with no delay. The infeasibilities, which indicate 
excessively high mitigation costs, suggest that constraining major low carbon 










Figure 2-10 NPV of mitigation costs up to 2095 for A.) 550 ppm CO2e and B.) 450 ppm 
CO2e targets under different constraints on the diffusion of multiple low-carbon 
technologies on top of delays in policy action from 2020. An “X” indicates an 
infeasible scenario. When mitigation action is delayed, achieving stringent climate 
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Even in a world with aggressive climate policies, factors other than relative prices of 
technologies including institutional, behavioral and social factors can slow the diffusion 
of low-carbon technologies. In this essay, I review the literature on the sources of such 
factors and have highlighted potential implications of technology diffusion constraints. I 
also study the implications of such constraints in the presence of major delays in climate 
policy action. This study differs from previous work on technology availability in that I 
impose exogenous diffusion constraints that aim to capture the effects of various factors 
that influence the rate of low-carbon technology diffusion. 
The analysis in this essay provides several insights. First, such factors may not be 
critically important without major delays in policy action. However, if political action is 
delayed by a few decades, these factors have greater influence on the feasibility (or, 
alternately, on the mitigation costs) of achieving stringent climate stabilization targets. 
Second, diffusion constraints become particularly important under delays when multiple 
technologies are jointly constrained. In the case of the GCAM integrated assessment 
model, for example, with no delay in globally coordinated mitigation action against 
climate change, when the diffusion of nuclear, renewables, CCS and bioenergy are all 
severely constrained, the 450 ppm CO2e target is achieved at higher mitigation costs. On 
the other hand, if these technologies are constrained with a 30 year delay, achieving the 
same target is infeasible. Likewise, this analysis shows that delayed action itself may not 
matter a lot in a world with no diffusion constraints. However, delayed action becomes 
extremely important with diffusion constraints on major low-carbon technologies. For 
example, without any diffusion constraints, a 450 ppm target with a 30-year delay can be 
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achieved at higher costs. However, under severe constraints on the diffusion of low-
carbon technologies, achieving this target becomes infeasible even with a 10-year delay 
in policy action.  
Third, constraints on the diffusion of CCS and renewables matter more than those on 
nuclear and bioenergy (with and without delays) mainly because the baselines in the 
latter cases are larger to begin with. In this context, the availability of low-carbon 
technologies on a large scale at the right timing is critically important if stringent climate 
stabilization goals are to be achieved. For instance, if the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies that would play a major role in the longer term (e.g., CCS) is severely 
constrained, greater mitigation in the near term is required resulting in higher mitigation 
cost compared to the case in which the diffusion of technologies that play a major role in 
the near term (e.g., renewables) is severely constrained, in which case, greater 
opportunities for mitigation in the longer term using negative emissions technologies 
(bio-CCS) exist. Under delays in policy action, these dynamics become further amplified, 
at times making some scenarios infeasible. The presence of factors serving to slow down 
the diffusion of low-carbon technologies in the real world implies that achieving long-
term policy targets may require particular focus on near-term policy for technology 
deployment. 
This analysis is not without limitations. First, the diffusion constraints specified in this 
analysis are constant over time. Thus, I have not been able to capture feedbacks between 
policy and diffusion. In the real world, for example, not only could the presence of 
factors constraining diffusion lead to higher carbon prices (one of the findings of this 
study), but the higher carbon prices could, in turn ease some of the constraints and 
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potentially speed up diffusion.  Nevertheless, I believe that insights that would have been 
obtained by modeling this endogeneity are captured, at least in part, by specifying 
different levels of diffusion rates.  Second, it may be likely that the diffusion rates are not 
constrained as severely as this chapter assumes, particularly for technologies such as 
wind and photovoltaics. For example, among other factors, economies of scale and ease 
of installation might ease the stringency of diffusion rate constraints for photovoltaic 
technologies. It is important to note that this chapter explored a range of scenarios in 
which not only were different levels of diffusion rate constraints imposed, but these were 
also imposed on different sets of low-carbon technologies. Also, the constraints 
considered in this chapter are meant to capture among others, institutional, behavioral and 
social factors that might limit diffusion rates even in the presence of favorable technology 
characteristics and policies (Hultman et al., 2012). The results of these scenarios should, 
therefore, not be seen as only showing the increasing difficulty of mitigation in the 
presence of diffusion rate constraints, but also viewed as highlighting the importance of 
addressing them. 
Third, I specify constraints in terms of net technology up-scaling rather than directly on 
new technology deployment. Therefore, these constraints may depend critically on the 
baseline technology stock profiles and the type of technologies that are constrained. 
Future analyses need to take into account the implications of time-varying diffusion 
constraints and also the dynamics of stock turnover. Nevertheless, I believe that the broad 
qualitative insights from this analysis would remain unchanged. Fourth, it is important to 
bear in mind that the scale of negative emissions in the second half of the century might 
influence the costs and feasibilities of the scenarios explored in this essay. Finally, future 
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studies must investigate the implications under less than perfect international cooperation 




Chapter 3 Long-term payoffs of near-term low-carbon 
deployment policies 
3.1. Introduction 
Recent climate change negotiations indicate that near-term actions to address climate 
change are likely to occur on the basis of national priorities and preferences. Countries 
are likely to employ a range of different policy options, not just idealized economy-wide 
carbon price based mechanisms. One common option under consideration is promoting 
the deployment of specific low-carbon technologies in the near-term through policies 
such as renewable portfolio standards, feed-in-tariffs, subsidies, etc. For example, in the 
recent US-China climate deal, China’s commitments focused on increasing the share of 
non-fossil energy sources in the near-term (The White House, 2014). Although 
promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies through policies such as subsidies 
involves a cost in the near-term, these policies can pay off in the future, through reduced 
costs of long-term emissions abatement, improved competitiveness of domestic industries 
leading to expanded exports and improved energy security. 
This essay focuses on reduced costs of long-term emissions abatement. There are two 
avenues for reducing long-term abatement costs (Figure 3-1). First, there is a near-term 
abatement effect. Promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies may avoid lock-
in into carbon-intensive technologies, leading to emissions abatement in the near-term. If, 
in the long-term, there is globally coordinated action against climate change to achieve a 
climate target by the end of the century, abatement in the near-term would result in lower 
abatement in the long-term because, the more abatement that occurs in the near-term, the 
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less that needs to occur in the long-term for a given long-term climate goal; resulting in 
reduced long-term abatement costs. Second, there is a technological change effect - 
promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies could lead to improvements in 
technology costs, reducing long-term abatement costs (Grubb, 1997; Grübler and 
Messner, 1998; Schneider and Goulder, 1997). An important question in this context is, 
how do these interact and what does this mean for the most effective mix of near country-
level deployment policies? Should all countries pursue the same technologies? Is a 
diversified approach more effective?  
The potential answers to these questions are complicated by the fact that what is cost-
effective globally may not be so from the domestic perspective. This difference between 
domestic and global outcomes is due to the public goods characteristics of both near-term 
abatement and technological change. Emissions abatement is a public good because 
greenhouse gases are well-mixed. Likewise, technological change that occurs 
domestically due to a domestic deployment policy may spill over to firms globally, also 
representing a public good (Clarke and Weyant, 2002).  
In this essay, I examine the divergence between long-term domestic and global outcomes 
in the context of an international approach to climate change, in which countries promote 
low-carbon technologies in the near-term by means of deployment policies. As I will 
show, the nature of this divergence depends critically on a range of factors, including the 
nature of technological change, technology spillovers, and domestic mitigation potentials. 
For the purpose of illustrating the potential implications of these various factors, I 
conduct a series of examples in which China and USA have the option to promote wind 
or solar technologies in the near-term. I use the Global Change Assessment Model 
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(GCAM), to produce results for this example under a range of different conditions. It is 
important to note that the aim of the analysis is not to represent any particular real-world 
policy, but rather to illustrate, by means of an example, the various forces at work, how 
they interact, and the implications for international collaborations on climate change 
mitigation and technology. 
 
Figure 3-1 An example of the long-term payoffs of near-term low-carbon deployment 
policies. Promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies by means of a 
deployment policy (such as subsidy or standard) would lead to reduced abatement costs 
in the long-term through two effects: the near-term abatement effect and technological 
change effect. 
The paradox that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes 




















































































range of  issues such as supply chain management (Cachon, 2001; Cachon and Netessine, 
2004) and even international climate change negotiations (Barrett, 2003). The principal 
contribution of this essay is to illustrate these effects in the context of low-carbon 
technology deployment policies and international climate change mitigation. Another key 
contribution of this essay is that it extends existing analyses based on energy-economic 
models that have explored the economics of “sub-optimal” near-term policies. Although 
several studies in the past have dealt with benefits of near-term mitigation actions and 
their implications for the long-term, they do not address the issue of near-term action 
from the perspective of technology policies or more specifically, deployment policies. 
Near-term policy in such studies is typically assumed to be the application of a carbon 
price.  Example of such studies include Bosetti et al. (2009a) and Jakob et al. (2012). 
Studies that do consider technology policies explicitly have either assessed different 
policy options for promoting low-carbon technologies (which approach is the best?) or 
focused on the interaction effects of carbon-price based and technology policies. As an 
example of the first type, Fischer and Newell (2008) used a theoretical model and found 
that in terms of achieving emissions reductions in the U.S. electricity sector, an emissions 
price policy ranked highest while subsidies for adopting renewables and R&D subsidies 
ranked lowest.  Studies such as Fischer (2008) and Fischer and Preonas (2010) use 
theoretical  models to make the argument that technology policies are effective only with 
emissions pricing and serve as complements to rather than substitutes for the latter. 
Examples of the second type include studies from the EU that are based on the interaction 
between the EU-ETS and renewable support schemes. Such studies use large-scale 
quantitative energy-economic models to conclude that the renewable support schemes do 
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not help in achieving any additional emissions reduction on a global level over and above 
the ETS and that they also tend to increase the overall mitigation costs (Böhringer et al., 
2009; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; del Río, 2009; Fankhauser et al., 2010; Pethig and 
Wittlich, 2009). 
In contrast to the above analyses, Clarke et al. (2010) explored the role of advanced 
technologies being available only in the United States versus globally and found that 
domestic and global benefits of achieving a stringent climate goal in these cases are 
vastly different. For example, if advanced technologies are made available everywhere 
but the United States, global abatement costs are lower than if advanced technologies are 
available only in the United States. On the other hand, if advanced technologies are made 
available in the United States alone, abatement costs to the United States are higher. This 
essay builds off the Clarke et al. (2010) study by introducing elements of heterogeneity in 
near-term technology choice and analyzing long-term implications from the perspectives 
of both, the globe as well as the individual countries undertaking deployment policies in 
the near-term. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a background on the long-term 
payoffs of promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term. The 
next section describes the construction of the analysis in which I consider the example of 
China and USA promoting wind and solar in the near-term. Following this, I use the 
Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) to understand how different configurations 
of near-term deployment policies impact domestic and global outcomes for the long-term. 




3.2. Review of long-term payoffs of near-term deployment policies 
Policy makers make use of a number of policy instruments to promote the deployment 
low-carbon technologies. Examples include renewable portfolio standards (which is 
prevalent in many US states and some European countries), feed-in-tariffs (common in 
majority of European countries, Australia, Canada and some developing countries), 
exempting energy taxes on low-carbon technologies, production tax credits and subsidies 
(for example for nuclear power in the US). Although such policies involve a cost in the 
near-term, they could pay off in the long-term. In this section, I review some of the long-
term payoffs of promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies through near-
country level deployment policies in the near-term.  
3.2.1. Reduced long-term abatement costs 
An important long-term payoff of promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
is that it could lead to reduced costs of emissions abatement in the long-term. Two main 
effects lead to this. The first is the near-term abatement effect. Technological and 
institutional inter-dependencies lead to considerable inertia in technological systems. 
Decisions made in the past may lead to technologies getting locked into particular 
configurations. Such co-evolution of technology clusters over time, also referred to as 
path dependency, creates constraints for the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, leading 
to a “carbon lock-in” (Arthur, 1989; Grübler et al., 1999; Unruh, 2000). Deployment 
policies to promote the deployment of low-carbon technologies help in avoiding carbon 
lock-in – they displace carbon-intensive fossil fuel technologies and add low-carbon 
energy to the energy system, leading to emissions abatement.  
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Near-term abatement is a public good because greenhouse gases are well mixed. 
Consequently, any abatement achieved by the investor country also applies to the globe. 
Hence, if, in the long-term, there is global action against climate change to achieve a 
climate target by the end of the century, abatement in the near-term would result in lower 
global abatement in the long-term, because, the more abatement that occurs in the near-
term, the less that needs to occur globally in the long-term. This would lead to reduced 
global abatement costs in the long-term. In addition, reduced global abatement in the 
long-term also implies reduced abatement by the investor country, resulting in reduced 
long-term abatement costs for the investor country as well. 
The second effect is the technological change effect. The literature on induced 
technological change suggests that promoting the development and deployment of 
technologies could lead to improvements in technology costs (Clarke et al., 2006; Clarke 
and Weyant, 2002; Jaffe et al., 2003; Popp et al., 2010). For example, the performance of 
a technology could improve as experience with the technology accumulates. This 
concept, widely known as learning-by-doing occurs as repetitive manufacturing tasks 
result in an improvement in the production process, which can also be supported by a 
number of forces such as increases in labor efficiency, new processes and changes in 
production methods, changes in the administrative structure, etc. Other avenues through 
which such improvements occur include users’ experience and feedback effects as 
sources of learning and further R&D and tacit learning through increase in the stock of 
knowledge arising out of exchange of information about product characteristics and user 
requirements between various actors such as research laboratories, industry, end-users 
and policy makers (see Kahouli-Brahmi (2008) for a detailed taxonomy and description 
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of such mechanisms). Promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies could thus 
generate cheaper technological options and emissions can be reduced at lower costs in the 
future, potentially leading to substantial economic benefits to the investor countries.  
The technological change effect also has public goods characteristics. Technological 
change that occurs domestically due to a domestic deployment policy may spill over to 
firms globally. A number of studies have confirmed the presence of such spillovers in the 
manufacturing sector (Argote et al., 1990; Barrios and Strobl, 2004), semiconductor 
industry (Irwin and Klenow, 1994), chemical processing industry (Lieberman, 1984) and 
the nuclear power industry (Lester and McCabe, 1993; Zimmerman, 1982). In a more 
recent study, Nemet (2012) analyzed a panel of electricity output from wind turbines in 
California, and found that firms not only learned from their own experience but from the 
experience of others as well. In the case of low-carbon technologies such as wind, it 
might also be reasonable to assume that spillovers exist on a global scale – because the 
global wind market is dominated by few turbine manufacturers, especially the Danish 
ones and because these big manufacturing companies deliver turbines all over the world 
and basically use the same technology concepts (Junginger et al., 2005).  
The public goods characteristics of the technological change effect described above could 
influence long-term abatement costs for the globe as well as the investor country. First, as 
explained earlier, since an emissions abatement technology is cheaper, the investor 
country would benefit from it for its own emissions abatement.  In addition, if the 
cheaper technology becomes widely available through spillovers, it lowers the cost of 
emissions abatement in general.  This effect would help the investor country even were it 
never able to utilize the technology itself, since the technology lowers the cost to all 
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parties leading to greater emissions reductions by other parties, and thereby reducing the 
level of effort needed in the investor country itself, further reducing abatement costs for 
the investor country.  
The above discussion suggests that the near-term abatement and technological change 
effects are rather complicated and deserve careful analysis. While examining these effects 
on the global and domestic long-term abatement costs is the focus of this paper, it is 
important to look at other avenues through which near-term low-carbon deployment 
policies could pay off in the future. In the following subsections, I review some such 
payoffs.  
3.2.2. Early-mover advantages 
Deployment policies targeted at specific technologies could create early-mover 
advantages for domestic firms. From the perspective of a firm, an important source of 
early-mover advantages is technological leadership. Cheaper technological options may 
arise due to the technological change effect explained earlier; and if those options can be 
kept proprietary through mechanisms such as patents, it could create barriers to entry for 
late entrants, creating opportunities for technological leadership. In this case, the returns 
garnered by the early moving firm are pure economic rents (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988).  
In addition to advantages at the firm level, expansion of a low-carbon industry could lead 
to increases in overall macro-economic growth through the expansion of export industries 
and associated increases in wages. A classic example in the energy industry is that of 
Denmark. Hansen et al. (2003) found that the Danish wind energy strategy not only 
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improved the international competitiveness of the industry but also compensated for the 
initial welfare loss.  Another example is that of the Spanish wind sector in which several 
hundred firms dedicated to equipment manufacturing, installation and sales, financial 
services, technical assistance, and maintenance services supply almost a fifth of all wind 
turbines installed in the world (Lund, 2009).  
In addition to the above advantages, expansion of low-carbon industries could create 
domestic employment opportunities. In the case of renewable energy policies, proponents 
have argued that compared to fossil-fuel power plants, renewable energy generates more 
jobs per unit of installed capacity, per unit of power generated and per dollar invested 
(Kammen et al., 2004; UNEP, 2008; Wei et al., 2010).  
3.2.3. Energy security 
Many countries promote alternative technologies with the objective of energy security. 
Industrialized as well as developing nations have shown renewed focus on energy 
security because of the exceedingly tight oil market and high oil prices and also due to 
other drivers such as the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting nations and 
geopolitical rivalries (Chester, 2010; Yergin, 2006).   
To summarize, promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term 
could pay off for the investor country in several ways, making a rather strong case for 
specialization in particular low-carbon technologies. However, because technologies have 
public goods characteristics, specialization may not lead to a globally cost-effective 
outcome. For example, if all countries were to specialize in the same low-carbon 
technology, from the global perspective, long-term abatement costs (assuming long-term 
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global action against climate change) would be greater than the case in which different 
countries specialize in different low-carbon technologies. This is because, in the latter 
scenario, technological improvements in more emissions abatement technologies could 
become widely available through spillovers, leading to lower global long-term abatement 
costs compared to the scenario in which all or most countries specialize in the same 
technology, in which case, spillovers could be redundant. Thus, we expect the globally 
cost-effective strategy to be a diversified portfolio of investments.7 
The above discussion suggests that, if countries were to interact and negotiate with each 
other on technology deployment, motivated by domestic economic benefits that might 
accrue from specializing in particular low-carbon technologies, we would expect to see a 
divergence between domestic and global outcomes. In the subsequent sections, I illustrate 
this divergence by means of an example in which China and USA have the option to 
promote wind or solar technologies in the near-term through deployment policies. I use 
the GCAM integrated assessment model to examine long-term payoffs for the globe as 
well as the investor countries. While the focus of the present analysis is on payoffs from 
reduced long-term abatement costs to illustrate the key dynamics in play, I also consider 
                                                 
7 Although I do not examine them in this study, other arguments for a diversified portfolio of investments 
in technology include diminishing returns to scale of experience and technological knowledge and risk 
management (see for example, Blanford and Clarke (2003)). Knowledge gained out of experience or R&D 
has been shown to exhibit diminishing returns to scale (Arrow, 1962). Hence, as marginal returns fall with 
increased investment, it will be optimal to invest in options that generate higher marginal returns to exploit 
the most productive range in each option. Likewise, diversification might also provide insurance against 
any single technology not advancing as fast as expected. Finally, under uncertainty about when and where 
unexpected technological breakthroughs might arise, diversification could provide the ability to take 
advantage of such opportunities. Note that the above arguments for diversification hold for individual 
countries as well. In this study, I do not investigate the case in which countries promote the deployment of 
different technologies, reserving it for future research. The focus of this essay is to understand the long-
term implications when countries are motivated by interests to specialize in particular technologies.  
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payoffs from early-mover advantages to understand how including such payoffs 
influences the key insights.  
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. The GCAM integrated assessment model 
This analysis uses the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) described in Section 
2.4. Features of the model that are relevant to this chapter are as follows. Outcomes of 
GCAM are driven by assumptions about population growth, labor participation rates and 
labor productivity in fourteen geo-political regions, along with representations of 
resources and technologies (Edmonds et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006). Deployment of 
technologies in GCAM depends on relative costs and is achieved using a logit-choice 
formulation in which not all decision makers choose a technology option just because it is 
cheaper; higher-priced options may also get some market share (McFadden, 1980). Costs 
of solar and wind technologies include exogenous capital and O&M costs; resource costs 
based on exogenous supply curves, representative of costs that are expected to increase 
with deployment as least-cost sites are used first (such as long-distance transmission line 
costs that would be required to produce power from remote wind resources) and 
endogenous resource intermittency costs (Clarke et al., 2008).  
3.3.2. Example of China and USA promoting wind or solar technologies in the near-
term 
In this essay, I consider an example of China and USA having the option to promote 
wind or solar technologies in the near-term and use GCAM to analyze long-term payoffs. 
Throughout the analysis, I assume that the near-term refers to the period between 2016 
63 
 
and 2030 and the long-term refers to the period between 2031 and 2100. The selection of 
countries for the example is based not only on relevance to recent policy discussions, but 
also differences in expected near-term energy system characteristics in the absence of any 
targeted deployment policy. For example, China’s energy system is dominated by coal 
and is expected to grow in the near-term (Figure 3-2 A). In contrast, gas and oil account 
for a significant share in the energy mix of USA, in addition to coal and the energy 
system is expected to remain stable. The selection of technologies is based on differences 
in expected near-term market maturities of the technologies in domestic as well as global 
markets. In the example, the relatively cheaper and mature technology is wind.  
Near-term low-carbon deployment policies are modeled as renewable portfolio standards 
to achieve an installed capacity of 500 GW by 2030 (roughly consistent with an 
extrapolation of China’s 2017 targets for installed capacity of wind technologies) 
(Bloomberg, 2014).8 Near-term costs are calculated as the change in both consumer and 
producer surplus due to the policy. For simplicity in illustrating the key dynamics in play, 
no other countries undertake mitigation during this period. These policies will lead to 
emissions abatement in the near-term, but they could also lead to technological change in 
the targeted technologies in the long-term. In the long-term, I assume that there is 
globally coordinated action (modeled as a global price on carbon) to achieve 550 ppm 
CO2e by 2100. In the long-term, I consider payoffs from reduced in abatement costs to 
illustrate the key dynamics. In addition, I consider payoffs from early-mover advantages 
                                                 
8 I fix the near-term installed capacities across possible deployment policy configurations to focus on the 
near-term abatement and technological change effects, keeping other variables fixed. Alternative 
assumptions about near-term installed capacities would not materially alter the insights obtained from this 
analysis.   
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to understand how these dynamics change when other payoffs are included. The above 
assumptions are summarized in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1 Summary of key assumptions  
Variable Near-term Long-term 
Period 2016-2030 2031-2100 
Policy mechanism 
Deployment policy (renewable 
portfolio standard) 
Global carbon price  
Policy stringency 
500 GW cumulative installed 
capacity by 2030 
550 ppm CO2e by 2100 
Costs 
Change in consumer and 
producer surplus due to policy 
None 
Payoffs None 





Deployment policies do not lead 




*Abatement costs are calculated as area under the marginal abatement cost curve 
** See Table 3-2 
  
I consider four scenarios to investigate the technological change effect (Table 3-2). First 
is the counterfactual scenario in which deployment policies do not lead to any additional 
improvements in technology costs (the “No additional technological change” scenario). If 
deployment policies lead to improvements in technology costs, they may apply only to 
the country that invests in the deployment policy (the “Faster domestic improvements” 
scenario) or spill over to other countries. If they do spill over, they may do so after some 
period of delay beyond 2030 (the “Faster domestic improvements and delayed spillovers” 
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scenario) or immediately in 2030 (the “Faster domestic improvements and immediate 
spillovers” scenario) (See Appendix C for a detailed description about technology costs).9 
Table 3-2 Technological change scenarios to study the technological change effect.   
 
Finally, in order to test the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about rates of 
technological improvements, I consider five sensitivity cases in which I vary the rates of 
technological improvements (Table 3-3). This also includes a breakthrough scenario in 
which promoting solar in the near-term leads to a technological breakthrough in solar 
technologies such that costs of solar technologies drop to one-fourth that of wind by 2050 
and rapidly decrease thereafter.  
 
                                                 
9 In this stylized representation of technological change, I do not explicitly track the sources of 
technological change to avoid uncertainties related to estimations of the effects of R&D and experience on 
technological change to influence the insights from the analysis. In other words, the analysis is largely 
agnostic to the specific mechanism through which technological change occurs. However, I do consider a 
number of sensitivity cases, including a breakthrough scenario to study the effect of the rate of 
technological change on the results.  
Technological change scenario
No additional technological 
change
Reference Reference








improvements and immediate 
spillovers
Advanced Advanced
Technology costs in the long-term








Table 3-3 Sensitivity cases to study the effect of rates of technological improvements on 
domestic and global outcomes.  
 
3.4. Effects of deployment policies in the near-term 
To understand the implications of deployment policies, it is useful to first explore the 
nature of technology deployment absent any near-term policies. In this case, near-term 
deployment of wind in both countries is larger than solar because wind is relatively more 
mature and cheaper – hence more competitive – compared to solar (Table 3-4). In 
addition, the deployments of both technologies are greater in China compared to USA 
because China’s energy demand grows far more rapidly. Differences in near-term 







Rate of improvement of 
reference solar technologies 
relative to reference wind 
technologies
Rate of improvement of 
advanced solar technologies 
relative to reference solar 
technologies
Rate of improvement of 
advanced wind technologies 
relative to reference wind 
technologies
Remarks





Costs of solar technologies drop 
to one-fourth of wind by 2050 and 







Table 3-4 Near-term deployments of wind and solar without and with a deployment 
policy in China and USA.  
 
Under deployment policies, fossil-fuel energy sources are replaced with low-carbon 
sources, leading to near-term emissions abatement (Figure 3-2 B). A solar policy leads to 
greater near-term abatement compared to a wind policy because a solar policy adds more 
low-carbon energy to the system (note that both, wind and solar policies are modeled to 
achieve the same cumulative capacity in the near-term and there is lesser solar to begin 
with, see Table 3-4). Consequently, the economic costs of a solar policy are higher 
(Figure 3-2  C). Near-term costs for USA and China are different because of differences 
in resource endowments and energy system characteristics (for example, China’s energy 
system is dominated by coal which is cheaper to displace compared to gas and oil which 
account for a significant share in the energy mix of USA, in addition to coal).  
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
China 177 11 500 500 323 489
USA 62 4 500 500 438 496
Country
[GW] [GW][GW]











Figure 3-2 A.) Near-term primary energy consumption in China and USA without and 
with deployment policy B.) Near-term abatements in direct CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel and industry with respect to the case without deployment policies  C.) Near-term 
costs of deployment policies, calculated as change in both consumer and producer 
surplus with respect to the case without deployment policy. Costs from 2016 to 2030 are 
discounted and cumulated.  
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3.5. Long-term payoffs from reduced abatement costs  
3.5.1. Near-term abatement effect 
To understand the near-term abatement effect, it is useful to first explore the scenario in 
which deployment policies do not lead to any additional technological improvements. 
Any reductions in long-term abatement costs would be due only to the near-term 
abatement effect. To compare different deployment policy configurations, I define payoff 
as the reduction in long-term abatement cost with near-term deployment policy relative to 
the case with no deployment policy divided by the near-term cost of the policy. Thus 
payoffs in this scenario would be proportional to the ratio of near-term abatement to near-
term cost. China’s payoffs are highest when China promotes wind and USA promotes 
solar because this configuration leads to the highest near-term abatement to cost ratio 
(Figure 3-3 A). In contrast, payoffs for USA are highest when USA promotes wind and 
China promotes solar (Figure 3-3 B). In other words, since near-term abatement is a 
public good, both countries benefit from a solar policy because that leads to more 
abatement;  however, promoting solar is more expensive, creating incentives to free-ride. 
Each country would prefer to promote the relatively mature and cheaper technology 
(wind) domestically and free ride on the benefits of the other country undertaking larger 
and more expensive abatement. The equilibrium strategy (derived as the Nash 
equilibrium for a non-cooperative game with imperfect but complete information10,11) is 
                                                 
10 I assume, here, that the countries are monolithic, unitary and rational actors with self-interest. Self-
interest means that that each country prefers a larger payoff to a smaller one. It also requires that each 
country does not directly care about the payoff received by the other country.   
11 In game theory, the difference between perfect and complete information is important. Perfect 
information refers to the case where each player knows how the other will act. Here I assume that the game 
is played only once and that players make their choices simultaneously, without knowing the other 
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for both countries to promote wind (Figure 3-4).12 This is also the globally cost-effective 
configuration because it leads to the highest near-term abatement to cost ratio (Figure 3-3 
C). In other words, from a global perspective, without improvements in technology, there 
is little reason to invest in the more expensive technology. 
3.5.2. Technological change effect 
When the technological change effect is included – that is, when deployment policies 
lead to faster improvements in domestic technology costs (that do not spill over to other 
regions)– domestic and global payoffs are higher because access to advanced wind or 
solar technologies results in reduced long-term abatement costs.  However domestic and 
global rankings of the configurations are not altered. Both countries are still better off 
promoting wind irrespective of the other country’s choice, making the China-wind-USA-
wind configuration the equilibrium strategy. In the absence of spillovers, this strategy is 





                                                                                                                                                 
country’s choice. Thus, this is a game of imperfect information. Complete information, on the other hand, 
refers to the case where each player knows the choices that both parties may make, the payoffs associated 
with every outcome and the preferences of the other player. In addition, I assume that all of this is common 
knowledge: each player knows that the other player knows these things, each knows that the other knows 
that it knows these things, and so on (Barrett, 2003). 
12 This outcome is the equilibrium because neither player would be better off by deviating unilaterally from 





Figure 3-3 Domestic and global payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs 
(reductions in long-term abatement costs relative to the case without near-term 
deployment policies divided by near-term costs of deployment policies) under central 
technology cost assumptions (see Table 3-3 for more a detailed description of the 
assumptions). The circled payoffs show the Nash equilibrium under a technological 
change scenario (see also, Figure 3-4). For both China and USA, highest payoffs are 
achieved by promoting wind domestically and free riding on the benefits of the other 
country promoting solar in all technological change scenarios. The Nash equilibrium 
corresponds to both countries promoting wind in all technological change scenarios. 
In contrast, in the presence of spillovers, global payoffs are highest when China 
promotes solar and USA promotes wind.  
A D G J
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Figure 3-4 Dominant strategies in a non-cooperative game with perfect information in 
which China and USA chose strategies with the only payoff of reduction in long-term 
abatement costs. The Nash equilibrium is for both regions to promote the cheaper 
technology, namely wind under all technological scenarios. The payoffs presented 
correspond to central technology cost assumptions (see Table 3-3 for more a detailed 
description of the assumptions). 
The technological change effect becomes important if technological improvements spill 
over to other regions (Figure 3-3 G-L). In these cases, global access to cheaper wind and 
solar technologies lowers marginal abatement costs throughout the globe (leading to 
lower carbon prices required to achieve the climate target). This effect leads to greater 
reductions in long-term abatement costs and so, higher payoffs for the investor region 
even were it never able to utilize the technology itself. This is because, lower marginal 
abatement costs in the rest of the world results in greater emissions reductions by other 
regions, thereby reducing the level of effort needed in the region itself. However, 
domestic rankings of the configurations and the equilibrium strategy remain unchanged. 
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This is because, promoting solar in the near-term is expensive and advanced solar 
technologies would be available irrespective of who undertakes the effort in the near-
term, adding to the free-riding incentives discussed earlier.  Therefore, both countries 
continue to remain better off promoting wind, irrespective of the other country’s choice. 
In contrast, global payoffs are highest when China promotes solar and USA promotes 
wind. Not only does this configuration lead to the highest near-term abatement to cost 
ratio, but improvements in both technologies spill over to other regions. In other words, 
the globally cost-effective configuration corresponds to the one in which public goods 
characteristics of near-term abatement as well as technological change are maximized.  
Domestic payoffs presented in the analysis so far could potentially be influenced by two 
assumptions. First, while I have considered one long-term payoff of near-term 
deployment policies (namely, reduction in long-term abatement costs), several others 
exist (see Section 3.2 for a detailed review). In the following subsection, I consider the 
implications of including payoffs from early-mover advantages for domestic outcomes. 
Second, assumptions regarding future rates of technological improvements induced by 
near-term deployment policies depend on a number of factors. For example, 
technological change in the rest of the world might spill over to China and USA inducing 
faster rates of technological improvements. In the subsequent subsection, I consider a 
number of sensitivity cases with a range of assumptions about rates of technological 
improvements (Table 3-3).  
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3.5.3. Long-term payoffs from early-mover advantages  
It is important to note that in the analysis so far, I have considered only one long-term 
payoff of near-term deployment policies, namely, reduced long-term abatement costs. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, promoting low-carbon technologies in the near-term could lead 
to other domestic payoffs in the long-term, with the potential of influencing the results 
observed earlier. While a detailed examination of all the payoffs reviewed in Section 3.2 
is beyond the scope of the present analysis, I explore how the inclusion of one other 
payoff, namely, early-mover advantages influences domestic long-term outcomes.  
The existence and magnitude of such advantages have been debated.  Some scholars are 
skeptical about early-mover advantages in adopting new technologies.  Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985), for example, showed that potential early-mover advantages may get 
completely dissipated under preemptive adoption. By including uncertainty about the 
profitability of new technology, Hoppe (2000) showed that there may be second mover 
advantages if spillovers are assumed to be present. In addition, technological, scientific 
and policy uncertainties (especially in the context of climate change) create an option 
value for delaying the adoption of a technology (Dixit, 1994). 
Likewise, the “green jobs” and “green growth” arguments are also controversial. Creation 
of  “green jobs” could be offset by job losses that result from the crowding out of cheaper 
forms of conventional energy generation, along with indirect impacts on upstream 
industries (Frondel et al., 2008; Frondel et al., 2010; Michaels and Murphy, 2009). 
Subsidies based policies often translate into higher electricity prices for the consumer 
resulting in lower profits for electric utilities (Traber and Kemfert, 2009). In addition, 
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higher electricity prices could impact economic activity and lead to additional job losses 
(Frondel et al., 2010). Michaels and Murphy (2009) also argued that because renewables 
require higher labor input per unit of output compared to fossil fuels, they bring down the 
overall productivity of the economy. The society thus sacrifices the outputs that those 
workers could have produced had they been employed elsewhere. Further, Frondel et al. 
(2010) argued that “green jobs” created by renewable energy promotion would vanish as 
soon as government support is terminated, leaving only the export sector to benefit from 
the possible continuation of renewables support in other countries. Indeed, in 2008, Spain 
accounted for the largest share of solar generation in the world, but its manufacturing and 
installation of new capacity virtually disappeared in 2009 when subsidies were cut off 
(Borenstein, 2012) (Note that this is not inherent in any specific technology. If firms are 
dependent on subsidies, when those revenue streams dry up, firms would reduce output. 
A similar effect is plausible, for example, in the defense industry which is dependent on 
government contracts). In addition to the above counter-arguments, there are several 
challenges to determining the employment effects of renewable energy - for example, an 
often ignored aspect of employment effects is job quality and job skills (Lambert and 
Silva, 2012).  
In this analysis, early-mover advantages are assumed to represent not only economic 
rents earned by firms in early-moving countries but also broader impacts on the economy 
such as job creation reviewed earlier. I approximate early-mover advantages to be equal 
to a fraction of global market revenue. Since the existence and magnitude of such 
advantages have been debated, I consider a range of fractions. In addition, I consider 
market revenues only until 2050, keeping in mind that early-mover advantages get 
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dissipated under competition and preemptive adoption (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; 
Hoppe, 2000).  
As explained previously, under central technology cost assumptions (corresponding to 
the analyses presented in Figure 3-3, see Table 3-3 for detailed assumptions), if countries 
were to promote low-carbon technologies in the near-term, the globally cost-effective 
strategy in terms of abatement costs of achieving a stringent long-term climate goal is a 
diversified approach in which different countries invest in different technologies. In 
contrast, the cost-effective strategy from the perspective of individual countries is to 
invest in currently mature and cheaper technologies. The question relevant to the present 
analysis is whether including early-mover advantages affects this outcome and align it 
with the globally cost-effective strategy.  
In this case, solar technologies are more expensive than wind even if deployment policies 
are assumed to lead to faster technological improvements in the long-term. Hence, in all 
technological change scenarios, global demand for solar technologies is lower than wind 
and the future global revenue from the solar market is smaller (Figure 3-5). As a result, 
even under optimistic assumptions about the presence and magnitude of early-mover 
advantages (which are proportional to the future global revenue), both countries continue 
to remain better off promoting wind irrespective of the other country’s choice and the 
equilibrium strategy remains unchanged (Figure 3-6).  
The results suggest that if countries interact with each other and make decisions on low-
carbon technology deployment driven by domestic advantage alone, such decisions will 
favor currently cheaper alternatives – even if domestic incentives other than reduced 
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long-term abatement costs are taken into account – primarily because such incentives 
might be closely tied with each other. This is because, technological change influences 
payoffs from long-term abatement costs as well as early-mover advantages in similar 
ways. Under central assumptions about rates of technological change (Table 3-3), solar 
technologies are more expensive than wind in the long-term in all technological change 
scenarios. Thus, long-term payoffs from reduced abatement costs with a near-term solar 
policy are lower than wind in all technological change scenarios. 
 
Figure 3-5 Global revenues (2031-2050) from the wind and solar markets in 
configurations with diversified approaches in which China and USA promote different 
technologies in the near-term. Revenues from 2031 to 2050 are cumulated and 
discounted. The cases presented here correspond to central assumptions about 








Figure 3-6 Domestic payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs and early-mover 
advantages under central technology cost assumptions (corresponding to analyses 
presented in Figure 3-3, see Table 3-3 for detailed assumptions). Early-mover 
advantages are calculated as a fraction of global market revenue. The circled payoffs 
show the Nash equilibria under a technological change scenario for a given fraction of 
global market. 
B. Payoffs for USA
A. Payoffs for China
C. Global Payoffs
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.5 0.8 Wind 0.5 0.8 Wind 0.6 1.1 Wind 0.6 1.2
Solar 0.2 0.2 Solar 0.2 0.2 Solar 0.2 0.2 Solar 0.2 0.2
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 1.0 1.5 Wind 1.1 1.5 Wind 1.1 1.8 Wind 1.1 1.9
Solar 0.3 0.3 Solar 0.3 0.3 Solar 0.3 0.3 Solar 0.3 0.3
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 1.3 1.8 Wind 1.3 1.9 Wind 1.3 2.2 Wind 1.4 2.3
Solar 0.3 0.4 Solar 0.3 0.3 Solar 0.4 0.4 Solar 0.3 0.3
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 1.8 2.5 Wind 1.9 2.5 Wind 1.9 2.9 Wind 1.9 2.9






























































































































Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.1 0.0 Wind 0.1 0.1 Wind 0.1 0.1 Wind 0.1 0.1
Solar 0.2 0.1 Solar 0.2 0.1 Solar 0.2 0.1 Solar 0.2 0.1
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.4 0.1 Wind 0.4 0.1 Wind 0.4 0.2 Wind 0.4 0.1
Solar 0.5 0.1 Solar 0.5 0.1 Solar 0.6 0.1 Solar 0.6 0.1
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.5 0.2 Wind 0.5 0.2 Wind 0.5 0.2 Wind 0.5 0.2
Solar 0.7 0.2 Solar 0.7 0.2 Solar 0.7 0.2 Solar 0.7 0.1
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.8 0.3 Wind 0.8 0.3 Wind 0.8 0.3 Wind 0.8 0.2
Solar 1.0 0.3 Solar 1.0 0.2 Solar 1.1 0.3 Solar 1.1 0.2
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Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.30 Wind 0.50 0.48 Wind 0.52 0.51
Solar 0.30 0.22 Solar 0.32 0.23 Solar 0.52 0.33 Solar 0.55 0.34















Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.53 0.81 Wind 0.55 1.14 Wind 0.56 1.21
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.17 0.19 Solar 0.23 0.24 Solar 0.24 0.25
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.06 Wind 0.12 0.07 Wind 0.12 0.07
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.16 0.06 Solar 0.22 0.07 Solar 0.23 0.07
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.30 Wind 0.50 0.48 Wind 0.52 0.51
Solar 0.30 0.22 Solar 0.32 0.23 Solar 0.52 0.33 Solar 0.55 0.34
No Additional Technological 
Change
Faster Domestic Technological 
Improvements
Faster Technological 
Improvements and Delayed 
Spillovers
Faster Technological 
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In addition, global solar revenue in all policy configurations and technological scenarios 
is lower than global revenue from wind. As a result, long-term payoffs from early-mover 
advantages with a near-term solar policy are also lower than a wind policy, even under 
optimistic assumptions about the magnitude of early-mover advantages in all 
technological change scenarios. Therefore, wind remains the dominant strategy even in 
terms of total payoffs from reduced abatement costs and early-mover advantages. 
Of course, the above treatment of early-mover advantages is rather simplistic and does 
not represent feedbacks to the economy. In spite of this drawback, it is useful, as a first 
approximation, to check whether including early-mover advantages will have any 
influence on domestic outcomes. As I show in the following section, if deployment 
policies lead to sufficiently rapid technological improvements, domestic outcomes may 
align with the global outcome even without considering early-mover advantages. 
3.5.4. Sensitivity of results to rate of technological change 
Assumptions regarding future rates of technological improvements induced by near-term 
deployment policies depend on a number of factors. For example, technological change 
in the rest of the world might spill over to China and USA inducing faster rates of 
technological improvements. In this section, I consider a number of sensitivity cases with 
a range of assumptions about rates of technological improvements (Table 3-3, Appendix 
D).   
Of particular interest is a scenario in which promoting solar in the near-term leads to a 
breakthrough in solar technologies since recent experience with photovoltaic 
technologies has shown that such technologies have potential for rapid technological 
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change (REN21, 2013). In the solar breakthrough scenario, costs of (advanced) solar 
technologies drop to one-fourth that of wind by 2050. In this case, access to advanced 
solar technologies in the long-term leads to greater reductions in long-term abatement 
costs compared to wind. Consequently, in the absence of spillovers, both countries are 
better off promoting solar irrespective of the other country’s choice even though 
promoting solar is expensive in the near-term. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy shifts 
to both countries promoting solar (Figure 3-7 D-F).  
In the presence of spillovers, if USA were to promote solar, China is better off promoting 
wind. As explained previously, promoting wind is cheaper. Also, this choice would make 
advanced wind technologies in addition to solar available to the rest of the world, 
reducing global carbon prices required to achieve the climate target and consequently 
increasing China’s payoffs. However, if USA were to promote wind, China is better off 
promoting solar rather than wind (even though promoting solar is expensive in the near-
term) because that would make the “breakthrough” solar technologies available to the rest 
of the world. Since “breakthrough” solar technologies are very cheap in the long-term, 
global access to those technologies would have a greater influence on global carbon 
prices compared to wind technologies, which are more expensive in the long-term. 
Consequently, this choice results in higher payoffs for China. Likewise, if China were to 
promote solar, USA is better off promoting wind and if China were to promote wind, 
USA is better off promoting solar. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies shift to China-
solar-USA-wind and China-wind-USA-solar configurations (Figure 3-7 G-L). These 
configurations are respectively, the highest and second highest in terms global payoffs. 
Thus, if deployment policies lead to sufficiently rapid technological improvements, 
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domestic outcomes may align with what is cost-effective globally. These results 
underline the importance of the rate of technological change and spillovers in influencing 
domestic outcomes and potentially aligning them with the global outcome. 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Domestic and global payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs 
(reductions in long-term abatement costs relative to the case without near-term 
deployment policies divided by near-term costs of deployment policies) assuming that 
promoting solar technologies leads to a breakthrough in solar technologies (see Table 
3-3 for more a detailed description of the assumptions). The circled payoffs show the 
Nash equilibrium under a technological change scenario. The Nash equilibrium 
assuming that deployment policies lead to faster technological improvements that do 
not spill over is for both countries to promote solar. In the presence of spillovers, the 
Nash equilibria are China-solar-USA-wind and China-wind-USA-solar configurations. 
These configurations are the highest and second-highest respectively in terms of global 
payoffs.  
A D G J
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.53 1.19 Wind 0.55 9.72 Wind 0.56 14.94
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 1.99 2.05 Solar 2.47 2.50 Solar 2.85 2.86
B E H K
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.55 Wind 0.12 0.69 Wind 0.12 0.83
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.33 0.58 Solar 1.88 0.71 Solar 2.85 0.83
C F I L
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.91 Wind 0.50 4.75 Wind 0.52 6.60
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The result on multiple equilibria obtained above for the solar breakthrough scenario 
requires further discussion. The games presented in the last two columns of Figure 3-7 
are similar to what are called “chicken” games.13 Throughout the analysis in this chapter, 
I have assumed that all games are played simultaneously.14 If we were to relax this 
assumption and assume that the games presented in the last two columns of Figure 3-7 
are played sequentially, the outcome would depend on who goes first. If China makes the 
first choice, China would prefer to promote wind – because, in that case, USA would 
promote solar and China would receive the highest payoff among the possible 
configurations. Likewise, if USA makes the first choice, USA would prefer to promote 
wind – because, in that case, China would promote solar and USA would receive the 
highest payoff among the possible configurations.  
Since the countries can gain by moving first, there might be scope for pre-emptive 
behavior. For example, if China’s payoffs are not known with certainty by USA, then 
China might be able to take actions that made USA believe that China would chose to 
promote wind, irrespective of USA’s choice (and USA would have similar incentives if 
China’s payoffs were not known with certainty by USA). And incentives for pre-emptive 
action could be large. For instance, in the delayed spillovers scenario, if China moved 
first and the outcome were China-wind-USA-solar, China’s payoff would be about 4 
times the payoff for the China-solar-USA-wind configuration which is the outcome that 
would result if USA moved first instead (Figure 3-7 G). Likewise, in the same scenario, if 
                                                 
13 The name "chicken" has its origins in a game in which two drivers drive towards each other along city 
streets that are too narrow for the cars to pass safely unless one driver slows down. But if one driver slows 
down and the other does not, the one who slowed down will be called a "chicken," meaning a coward. 
14 It can be verified that even if the games presented in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-6 are played sequentially, 
domestic outcomes do not change.  
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USA moved first and the outcome were China-solar-USA-wind, USA’s payoff would be 
about 3 times the payoff  for the China-wind-USA-solar configuration which is the 
outcome that would result if China moved first instead (Figure 3-7 H). However, from the 
global perspective, it does not really matter who goes first. For example, in the delayed 
spillovers scenario, global payoff for the China-wind-USA-solar configuration is only 
14% lower than the China-solar-USA-wind configuration (Figure 3-7 I). Therefore, in the 
absence of some kind of cooperative agreement or third party enforcement, the presence 
of such advantages could result in both countries promoting wind – which would lead to 
the least payoffs from the global perspective. 
The results presented in this section suggest a role for international cooperation in the 
diffusion of different low-carbon technologies – not only because such cooperation could 
induce faster technological change, but also because cooperation could avoid globally 
inefficient outcomes that may potentially arise out of pre-emptive actions.   
3.6. Conclusions 
Steps to mitigate climate change are increasingly moving toward a bottom-up approach 
wherein countries take actions based on national priorities and preferences. One popular 
near-term action under consideration is to promote low-carbon technologies in the near-
term because that can pay off in the long-term. In this chapter, I consider a hypothetical 
example of China and USA having the option to promote wind or solar technologies in 
the near-term and investigate the implications for long-term payoffs from reduced costs 
of future abatement under a range of assumptions about the rates of technological change 
and spillovers. This example illustrates that under certain assumptions about 
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technological change, domestic and global outcomes are divergent. This divergence 
occurs because public goods characteristics of technologies combined with differences in 
near-term costs of promoting different technologies create incentives to free-ride. If 
countries make decisions on low-carbon technology deployments driven by domestic 
economic benefits alone, such free-riding incentives might tilt investments toward 
currently dominant or mature alternatives. On the other hand, to the degree that the 
international community is looking toward achieving a long-term climate goal cost-
effectively, the findings of this essay argue for the need for broader development and 
deployment of a diverse portfolio of low-carbon technologies—not just the current 
dominant alternatives. This suggests a role for international cooperation in the broader 
development and diffusion of diverse low-carbon technologies. For example, left to 
themselves, developing countries might not be interested to undertake investments in 
currently expensive technologies such as CCS. The results of this chapter argue that there 
are global benefits to encourage and facilitate such investments through some form of 
cooperative or collaborative mechanisms that are more subtle than relatively stale calls 
for simple “technology transfer”. Instead, the cooperation would focus on developing 
markets and institutions beyond those explicitly related to climate, including those for 
trade, development, and intellectual property (Newell, 2010). 
The analysis in this chapter also underlines the importance of the rate of technological 
change in influencing long-term domestic payoffs of near-term deployment policies - 
domestic and global outcomes may align if deployment policies can induce sufficiently 
rapid technological change in currently expensive technologies. This finding further 
supports the argument for international cooperation in the development and diffusion of 
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diverse low-carbon technologies. This is because, such cooperation will foster 
technological change and increase spillovers which will be instrumental in aligning 
domestic policy objectives with international goals and avoid globally ineffective 
outcomes. 
It is important to note that the results in this chapter are dependent on one particular 
formulation of technological change and others are quite possible. First, I assume that 
increasing the deployment of low-carbon technologies leads to faster reductions in 
technology costs. However, in the case of energy technologies such as nuclear, increase 
in deployment has often led to an increase rather than a decrease in technology costs. 
Scholars have argued that increased construction times due to increased size and 
complexity of reactors coupled with new environmental, health and safety regulations 
and increased difficulty in standardization due to the site-specific nature of deployment 
have led to escalating capital as well as operating and maintenance costs in the nuclear 
industry (Cantor and Hewlett, 1988; Cooper, 2010; Grübler, 2010; Hewlett, 1996; 
Hultman and Koomey, 2007; Hultman et al., 2007; Joskow and Rose, 1985). Such cost 
escalations have been found in other manufacturing industries in addition to nuclear – For 
example, Argote and Epple (1990) found that the unit production costs of the Lockheed 
L-1011 TriStar aircraft fell as production increased from 1972–1975, but escalated after a 
production cut in late 1975. They argued that “organizational forgetting” or depreciation 
of knowledge due to factors such as individual employees forgetting to perform their 
tasks or individuals leaving the organization and being replaced by others with less 
experience were responsible.  
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Second, the results are dependent not only on assumptions about the rates and direction 
of technological change, but also spillovers. While the existence of spillovers is nearly 
undisputed in the literature, the nature of spillovers across regional boundaries is unclear. 
It is plausible that spillovers from abroad cannot be appropriated by domestic firms or 
such appropriation might be costly and limited by institutional, political and even cultural 
factors (Braun et al., 2010; Clarke and Weyant, 2002). For example, in a recent 
econometric estimation, Braun et al. (2010) used patent data for 21 OECD countries to 
show that innovation in wind and solar technologies is strongly driven by knowledge 
spillovers. However, the study concluded that spillovers are domestic in nature and 
international spillovers are insignificant. One explanation for this is that the pool of 
knowledge available domestically may be large enough that acquiring foreign knowledge 
is redundant. Another more plausible explanation could be that appropriation of foreign 
knowledge is expensive compared to domestic knowledge. The above discussion 
highlights that results presented in this chapter for scenarios assuming no additional 
technological change and different levels of spillovers might be equally important and 
merit attention.  
Finally, the formulation in this analysis does not consider diversity within countries, that 
is, the option of countries promoting different technologies domestically in order to retain 
focus on demonstrating the effects of different technology choices on domestic and 
global outcomes. The above caveats notwithstanding, the analysis presented in this 
chapter calls for a solid assessment of the technologies in question, their potential for 
improvement and the nature of spillovers in policy collaborations aimed at undertaking 
stringent mitigation in the future.  
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Chapter 4 Non-uniform investment risks and patterns of 
climate change mitigation15 
4.1. Introduction 
The international community has established a target of keeping global mean temperature 
rise below 20C in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system (UNFCCC, 2010). Achieving such a stringent target will require a dramatic 
transformation of the energy system; a transformation which in turn involves large scale 
investments (McCollum et al., 2013). Investment depends not only on the supply or 
availability of funds but also on the capacity to carry out the physical investment. 
Because decisions on investments involve multiple institutions that respond to various 
criteria in different regions differently, this capacity is non-uniform across the globe.  
Previous assessments of emissions mitigation patterns have largely ignored the huge 
variation in real-world factors—in particular, institutions—that affect where, how and at 
what costs firms deploy capital (Calvin et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2009; Kriegler et al., 
2014; McCollum et al., 2013; Riahi et al., 2015). There are strong reasons to believe that 
the risk of investment varies across countries, sectors and technologies.  In this essay, I 
review the literature on these reasons and answer the following question: How do 
differences in investment risks affect the costs and geography of climate change 
mitigation?  
                                                 
15 This chapter is based on (Iyer et al., 2015b) 
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This essay contributes to the growing literature on climate policy analysis under 
imperfect circumstances. Examples of such studies include limits on the availability or 
growth of technologies (see for example, Tavoni et al. (2012)), delays in establishing 
international climate policy regimes (see for example Jakob et al. (2012), Bosetti et al. 
(2009a) and Calvin et al. (2009)) and labor market imperfections (see for example 
Guivarch et al. (2011)). Among previous studies that attempt to address similar issues, 
Bosetti and Victor (2011) showed that due to lack of regulatory credibility, agents 
become myopic and are unable to make optimal investments in energy technologies. This 
increases the costs of achieving stringent climate goals. Along similar lines,  Ekholm et 
al. (2013) studied the effects of financial constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa by including 
capital supply curves in a linear cost optimization model with perfect foresight and 
concluded that limited capital supply decreases investments to capital-intensive low-
carbon technologies especially in the near term. They also found that because emissions 
are higher in the near term, the emissions price required to meet a given long-term 
emissions target is higher. While the above studies tackle either the issue of credibility or 
availability of funds, I address the question of differences in capacities to undertake 
physical investments. Effects of such non-uniformities have not been studied sufficiently 
and there are reasons to believe that they might be substantial in their effects on eventual 
low-carbon deployment. The central contribution of this essay is to demonstrate how 
imperfections in the process of investment—which arise from a “mosaic” of actors, 
institutions, regional and national objectives that vary in their ability to attract and deploy 




This chapter is organized as follows. I first review the literature on the factors affecting 
socially optimal levels of investment and the reasons for the variation of investment risks 
across regions, sectors and technologies. Following this, I use the GCAM integrated 
assessment model and incorporate decisions on investments based on risks along two 
dimensions (Table 4-2).  Along the first dimension, I vary perceived risks associated with 
particular technologies. To do so, investment in low-carbon technologies are assigned a 
higher cost of capital as these involve intrinsically higher levels of regulatory and market 
risk. The second dimension uses a proxy to vary investment risks across regions, based 
on an institutional quality metric published by the World Economic Forum (Schwab, 
2013). In addition to these two dimensions of variation in investment risks, I consider 
scenarios with and without a climate target. I restrict the analysis to investments in the 
electricity generation sector, which are expected to account for a significant share of 
future investments in the context of climate change mitigation (McCollum et al., 2013).  
4.2. Factors affecting investment 
Many hard-to-model factors have the potential to affect investment in low-carbon energy.  
At the macro-level, several factors affect saving rates and economy-wide capital 
formation. For example, the quality of institutions in a country may affect regulatory 
credibility and discourage investment in general. At the sector-level, idiosyncrasies 
related to specific sectors could lower returns to capital in such sectors thereby affecting 
investment. The electricity sector is a classic example of a sector in which returns to 
capital can be influenced by government regulations. Likewise, at the technology-level, 
particular technologies face special risks. For instance, regulatory challenges make 
investment in nuclear technologies more risky in many countries. Finally, factors at the 
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level of the firm such as ownership structure and individual decision-makers such as 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers also affect investment. In this 
section, I review the literature on such factors.  
4.2.1. Macro-level factors: Investment from an institutional economics perspective 
The vast literature on institutional economics discusses how the quality of institutions 
affects investment.   Institutions are the formal and informal rules that constrain 
individual behavior and shape human interaction. Institutions are devised to create order 
and reduce uncertainty in exchange. A solid institutional framework is necessary to 
encourage private investment. Investors will be reluctant to risk their capital when 
property rights are weak and poorly protected, and if, as a result, they fear that their 
returns may be appropriated by others (North, 1990). Empirical studies on the link 
between institutions and investment have confirmed this theory. For example, Knack and 
Keefer (1995) conducted  cross-country regressions and found that security of property 
rights affects not only the magnitude of investment, but also the efficiency with which 
inputs are allocated. Likewise, Acemoglu et al. (2005) showed that institutions determine 
not only the aggregate economic growth potential of the economy, but also the 
distribution of resources (wealth, physical and human capital) in the future.  In addition, 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) showed that in developing countries that lack large and 
efficient financial markets, investors tend to invest in safer projects with lower return 
because the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of risk diversification. This 
slows down capital accumulation, and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk 
introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process.  
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Empirical research also shows that institutional quality affects foreign direct investment. 
Investors considering FDI may be particularly concerned about the likely exposure to 
requests for bribes and the need to work through red-tape in host countries. Similarly, 
weak institutions in a recipient country (including lack of transparency in the corporate 
sector and weak corporate governance) may deter international investors from acquiring 
portfolio equity stakes there (Faria and Mauro, 2009). Busse and Hefeker (2007) used 
data from 83 developing countries between the period from 1984 to 2003 and  found that  
government stability, the absence of internal conflict and ethnic tensions, basic 
democratic rights and ensuring law and order are highly significant determinants of 
foreign investment inflows. Along similar lines, Alfaro et al. (2008) showed that poor 
institutional quality is the most important reason for lack of capital flows from rich to 
poor countries between 1970-2000. Likewise, Wei (2001) applied a gravity model of 
bilateral FDI stocks and bank loan stocks to a sample of about 10 source countries and 20 
recipient countries and found that weaker institutions are associated with less FDI and 
more bank loans.  
Contract enforcement tends to be weak in countries with inferior institutions and that has 
adverse effects on investment. For example, Clague et al. (1999) showed that investment 
is adversely affected in countries that lack adequate third-party contract enforcement 
because in such countries, firms are usually restricted to capital that can be obtained 
through savings or other domestic sources. Therefore, economic gains from either 
capital-intensive or large-scale production are lost. On the other hand, in places where 
institutions increase the certainty that contracts will be honored and property protected, 
individuals will be more willing to specialize, invest in sunk assets, undertake complex 
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transactions and accumulate and share knowledge (North, 1990). In addition, credible and 
effective regulations will be critical to facilitate investment (Levy and Spiller, 1994). For 
example, if the government has incentives to change taxes or regulations ex-post with the 
knowledge that investors cannot easily withdraw, investors can delay or forego 
investment, especially if they are large and irreversible. 
In short, the quality of institutions will have a major influence on investment required for 
transformational change in the context of the energy system because that is closely tied 
with the magnitude of Ronald Coase’s “transaction costs” (Coase, 1960). As Coase points 
out, the effects of high transaction costs “are pervasive in the economy. Businessmen, in 
deciding on their ways of doing business and on what to produce, have to take into 
account transaction costs. If the costs of making an exchange are greater than the gains 
which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not take place...” (Coase, 1992). 
4.2.2. Sector-level factors: example of investment in the electricity sector 
The electricity sector is one example of a sector which is expected to involve large 
investments in the future, especially in the context of climate change mitigation, and 
therefore presents a useful case to investigate (McCollum et al., 2013). Traditionally, due 
to network effects and economies of scale that create high barriers to entry, the electricity 
sector had remained a natural monopoly. In the last few decades, however, the electricity 
sector has undergone reforms all over the world. The principles of these reforms are 
guided by three main elements. First, the idea that generation is not intrinsically 
monopolistic and can be supplied by competitive private firms led to unbundling 
generation from transmission and distribution. On the other hand, the transmission and 
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distribution segments of the electricity sector need to be regulated because these markets 
are replete with network effects and barriers to entry that make them prone to monopoly. 
Second, the belief that private entities, rather than the state, could better allocate capital 
and assure efficient operations lead to privatization of ownership of those parts of the 
power system that could be competitive. The final step involved creating powerful new 
institutions—notably, independent regulators (Heller and Victor, 2004).  
In spite of these reforms, the electricity sector has some peculiar characteristics that affect 
investment. First, the technology involves large specific, sunk investments (note that this 
characteristic is generally true throughout the energy sector). Therefore, once the 
investment is undertaken the operator will be willing to continue operating as long as 
operating revenues exceed operating costs. Since operating costs do not include a return 
on sunk investments, the operating company will be willing to operate even if prices are 
below total average costs. Second, the sector is characterized by massive economies of 
scale and scope, implying that the number of suppliers will be small, giving rise to 
monopoly power, especially in the transmission and distribution sector. Third, outputs 
from this sector are consumed widely by households and industry. Hence, politicians and 
interest groups will care about the level of pricing (Bergara et al., 1998; Spiller, 1995). 
Therefore, governments have incentives to behave opportunistically with the investing 
company. Expropriation of sunk assets may be profitable for a government if the direct 
costs (such as loss of reputation or reduced investment in the future) are small compared 
to the short-term benefits of such action (such as achieving re-election by reducing 
electricity prices for consumers or by attacking the monopoly), and if the indirect 
institutional costs (such as disregard of the judiciary or not following the proper 
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administrative procedures) are not too large (Spiller, 1995). This discourages investors by 
creating additional risks. Indeed, using a sample of thirty-four independent power 
projects in thirteen countries, Woodhouse (2006) showed that regulatory credibility in 
host countries  is important for risk-averse investors because of the fear that 
unpredictable changes in regulations will lead to expropriation of fixed assets. Note that 
investment patterns in other sectors may be quite different than for the electricity sector.  
For example, at the geographical scale used in most IAMs, investments in power 
production are likely to be domestic; that may not be the case in the transportation sector 
where fuels and vehicles may be imported rather than produced domestically. Similarly, 
investments in some sectors may primarily be self-financed by firms rather than through 
commercial or development institutions. 
4.2.3. Project and technology level factors 
Regulatory and policy uncertainty could affect investment in particular technologies. 
Non-conventional technologies may face regulatory challenges (e.g. safety and 
environmental regulations for nuclear power plants) because of which investment is more 
risky due to the probability of failure or stoppage and hence losing any expected future 
cash-flow (Ekholm et al., 2013). Likewise, a number of scholars have argued that 
uncertainty in carbon price will delay investment in low-carbon  technologies (e.g. Fuss 
et al. (2012), Laurikka and Koljonen (2006), Laurikka (2006)). Newer technologies face a 
special investment challenge – because investors are unaware about the performance of 
new technologies, they will expect higher rates of return (Jaffe et al., 2002). In addition, 
technologies whose cost structures are fuel-intensive face the increased risk of exposure 
to market uncertainties (Krohn et al., 2009). Technologies in the electricity sector face an 
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additional risk – wholesale electricity prices are volatile due to the homogenous nature of 
electricity, its lack of storability, inelastic demand and the steepness of the supply curve 
as electricity production nears system capacity (Borenstein, 2002; Roques et al., 2005). 
Likewise, uncertainty in price of commodities and other inputs adds to the risks perceived 
by investors.  
Increased penetration of intermittent technologies such as wind may affect investment in 
other technologies. Steggals et al. (2011) argued that in a market with high penetration of 
wind which is typically characterized by long periods of low prices and a short periods of 
high wholesale prices, investment in other low carbon technologies such as nuclear will 
be adversely affected because of its high capital costs and relative inflexibility.  Other 
factors affecting investment at the technology level include unplanned plant closure, for 
example owing to unavailability of resources, plant damage or component failure, risk of 
a fall in volume of electricity produced owing to lack of wind or sunshine, etc. These 
factors affect investment in technologies differently and may lead to a re-ordering of the 
relative attractiveness of the various investment options.  All else being equal, investors 
would prefer to invest in lower risk technologies 
4.2.4. Firm and individual level factors 
One of the key factors affecting investment decisions is the ownership structure of the 
firm. For a public utility, money can be borrowed at relatively low rates because the risk 
of default is low. On the other hand, the cost of money would be much higher for a 
private utility which is exposed to the uncertainties of the market. Likewise, the type of 
financing used by the firm could imply different risks. Corporate financing uses corporate 
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credit and general assets of a corporation, typically a utility, as the basis for credit and 
collateral. This is less risky compared to project financing in which lenders base credit 
appraisals on the estimated cash flows from the facility rather than on the assets or credit 
of the corporation. Apart from the above factors, several others at the level of the 
individual such as information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and principal-
agent problems could affect investment, especially in the demand-side of the energy 
sector (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this essay, I focus only on 
the supply side in the electricity generation sector; a detailed examination of factors in the 
demand-side is beyond the scope of this study.   
Due to the factors reviewed above, investments may not take place at the socially optimal 
level. However, under certain circumstances, investment risks can be mitigated and 
investment encouraged. In the following subsection, I consider the case of China, in 
which investment in energy is low-risk due to a combination of factors including 
favorable policy environment and state-capitalism.  
4.2.5. Special case: investment in China 
Among developing economies, China currently accounts for the largest share of 
investment across all major technologies in the electricity sector. For example, in the year 
2013, Chinese investment in renewable energy was the highest, more than even the whole 
of Europe (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2014). China accounts for more than a 
third of all proposed coal plants and more than a third of all proposed nuclear power 
plants worldwide (WNA, 2013). From the perspective of an investor, investing in the 
Chinese electricity sector is relatively low-risk because Chinese electricity demand will 
97 
 
continue to grow and any investment in the electricity sector will provide attractive 
returns. In addition, China’s 12th Five Year Plan lays emphasis on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. This gives clear signal that investment in these areas will be 
encouraged (Sullivan, 2011). Also, policies such subsidies, feed-in-tariffs and income tax 
incentives encourage investment (Rong and Victor, 2011; Victor et al., 2012). Most 
importantly, China’s system of “state capitalism” that tries to juxtapose the powers of the 
state with the powers of capitalism, allows for a different character of large-scale energy 
investment that bolsters capital-intensive technologies and projects with higher market 
risks. First, the Chinese energy sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises that are 
often able to manage risks by shifting them to the government. Second, financing from 
Chinese “policy banks” such as the Chinese Development Bank that finance the 
construction of new power plants including emerging technologies such as solar through 
extremely low interest rates reduces financial risks considerably. In addition, state 
support usually limits delays associated with acquiring rights of way or essential permits. 
Note, however, that such advantages may not be unique to China, and they often arise 
when state-backed firms raise debt; for example, Mexico’s Pemex (Victor et al., 2012).  
The factors reviewed in this section create non-uniformities in investment risks across 
regions, sectors and technologies. Such non-uniformities will have important implications 
for the large-scale investments in the energy system required to address the climate 
change problem because investors could respond to them by expecting higher returns to 





As in the first two essays, I use the GCAM integrated assessment model to analyze how 
differences in investment risks across regions and technologies affect first-best 
trajectories and outcomes of achieving stringent climate targets. Among different 
variables affected by differences in investment risks, I focus on the cost of capital for 
investment.  
Risk-averse investors expect risk-adjusted rate of return, raising the cost of capital for 
investing in projects involving greater risk. The cost of capital affects investment at the 
level of the technology and the macro-economy. At the technology level, the cost of 
capital affects the balance between capital and running costs. On the aggregate 
macroeconomic level, variables such as institutional quality can affect the cost of capital 
which in turn influence the rate and magnitudes of capital formation.  
I restrict the analysis to capital investments in electricity generation, which are expected 
to account for a significant share of future investment in the context of climate change 
mitigation (McCollum et al., 2013). In addition, biomass-based technologies in sectors 
other than electricity, for example biofuels and biogas are included to avoid the results 
from being influenced by availability of biomass resources. For instance, if biomass-
based technologies were to be excluded, a higher risk of investing in the electricity sector 
would shift investment to bioenergy (which would remain low-risk) to satisfy growing 
energy demand and meet a stringent climate target. Note that GCAM operates in a partial 
equilibrium framework. Conducting the analysis in a general equilibrium framework or 
including other key energy or land use sectors in the analysis will provide additional 
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insights but will not materially affect the broad qualitative insights from the current 
analysis. 
4.3.1. The cost of capital and Fixed Charge Rates 
In GCAM, the cost of capital is represented in the fixed charge rate (FCR). In this 
section, I explain the different terms and concepts surrounding the cost of capital.  
Typically, firms use a combination of debt and equity to finance their businesses. The 
cost of debt is “the amount paid to the holders of debt securities for the use of their 
money” (Short et al., 1995). The amount paid, which is the lending interest rate is set by 
banks. Since the interest is tax-deductible, the cost of debt is usually calculated on an 
after-tax basis. The cost of equity refers to the “the earnings expected by an investor 
when purchasing equity shares in a company” (Short et al., 1995). Note that equity is a 
riskier form of financing compared to debt and so the cost of equity is greater than the 
cost of debt. The expected return on any investment can be written as the sum of the risk-
free rate and a premium to compensate for the risk (the risk-free rate represents the time 
value of money and compensates investors for placing money in any investment over a 
period of time). The equity risk premium, thus refers to the premium added to the risk-
free rate to estimate the cost of equity. The overall cost of capital is derived from a 
weighted average of all capital sources, widely known as the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). The WACC is used as the discount rate, which reflects the fact that the 
value of a cash flow depends on the time at which the flow occurs.  
Finally, the Fixed Charge rate (FCR) represents “the before-tax revenue that a profit-
maximizing firm would require annually to cover its cost and carrying charges of an 
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investment and to achieve its desired after-tax return. Carrying charges include return on 
debt and equity, income and property tax, book depreciation, and insurance.” The FCR is 
a function of the discount rate and the lifetime of the capital investment and is given by 









, where T 
is the marginal income tax rate, PVDepreciation is the present value of depreciation and 
lifetime refers to the lifetime of the capital investment (Short et al., 1995). 
4.3.2. Representing non-uniform investment risks 
In this analysis, I vary FCRs across technologies and regions in the electricity generation 
sector (Figure 4-1).  
 
Figure 4-1 Sequence of steps followed to represent non-uniformities across 
technologies and regions in the electricity generation sector.  
While variation across technologies affects the choice between low-carbon technologies 
and fossil-fuel technologies that have capital-intensive and fuel-intensive cost structures 
respectively, the variation across regions is represented to capture the macroeconomic 
effects explained above. To represent variation of investment risks across technologies, I 
first compile FCR values used for financial analyses of electricity generation 
technologies in the United States (Bunn et al., 2003; NETL, 2011; Tegen et al., 2012) 
(Table 4-1). I then categorize technologies into low-risk (fossil-fuel technologies) and 
Fixed charge 






lending rates and 
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high-risk (nuclear, renewables, bioenergy, CCS) with FCRs of 13% and 17% 
respectively.  
To model non-uniformities across regions, I use a proxy to vary investment risks across 
regions, based on an institutional quality metric published by the World Economic Forum  
(Schwab, 2013) (Figure 4-2).  I use country-level institutional scores from the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index data-set to calculate GDP-weighted 
scores for the fourteen GCAM regions. I then look at spreads of macroeconomic lending 
rates (reflecting the costs of debt) and equity risk premiums across countries (Figure 4-3). 
Next, I represent FCRs as a log-linear function of institutional quality and adjust the 
parameters of the function to be consistent with the spreads observed in Figure 4-3. 
Assuming that FCRs vary with institutional quality scores according to a log-linear 
relationship, FCRs for regions other than the U.S. are calculated using the following 
expression: 𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =  𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐴 × 𝑓 where 𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 is the FCR for technology i in region j 
and f is given by:  𝑓 =  
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑗
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝐴
 , where 𝐼𝑄𝑗  refers to the GDP-weighted institutional 
quality score for region j (Benítez et al., 2007; Erb et al., 1996). 𝛾0 and 𝛾1which are 
parameters of the log-linear model are chosen such that the spread in FCRs across 
GCAM regions is consistent with the spreads observed in lending rates and costs of 
equity in Figure 4-3. Not only is this representation useful to capture the macroeconomic 
effects explained earlier, it also reflects behavior of investors in the real world, where 
investors demand risk-adjusted rates of return.  
Next, I explore four investment risk scenarios that vary along two dimensions (Table 
4-2). Along the first dimension, I vary investment risks only across technologies and 
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along the second, I vary investment risks along institutions. As a point of departure, I also 
consider a counterfactual uniform investment risk scenario. In addition to these two 
dimensions of variation in investment risks, I consider scenarios with and without a 
climate target. The climate policy scenarios all require a reduction in global CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels and industry of 50% in 2050 relative to 2005 levels (Figure 4-
4) (IPCC, 2014). Table 4-3 summarizes the central assumptions across the investment 
risk scenarios explored in this study.  
 
Figure 4-2 Quality of national institutions based on the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index dataset  (Schwab, 2013). Assuming that non-
uniformities in investment risks arise due to differences in institutional qualities, I use 
these data to represent costs of capital for investing in the electricity generation sector 
as a function of the quality of a country's institutions. This reflects behavior of 
investors in the real world, where investors demand risk-adjusted rates of return that 









Table 4-1 Fixed Charge Rate assumptions in literature for financial analyses in the 
United States a,b  
 
a The Fixed Charge rate (FCR) represents “the before-tax revenue that a profit-maximizing firm would require annually 
to cover its cost and carrying charges of an investment and to achieve its desired after-tax return.” The FCR is a 










, where T is the marginal income tax rate, PV Depreciation is the 
present value of depreciation and lifetime refers to the lifetime of the capital investment. Typically, the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) is used as the discount rate (Short et al., 1995).  
b FCRs in this table are based on after-tax WACC, which is used as the discount rate. The WACC depends on the debt 
to equity ratio, among other variables. Investor-owned utilities and independent power producers differ in debt/equity 
ratios (higher for the latter). The FCRs shown here do not include insurance and property taxes. In this study, I specify 
an FCR of 13% for low-risk technologies and 17% for high –risk technologies. FCRs of 13% and 17% correspond 
roughly to WACCs of 8% and 10% respectively and capital lifetime of 30 years.  
c For CCS technologies, WACC calculations are based on lower debt/equity ratios compared to fossil-fuel technologies.  
d The lower value of the FCR for renewables is in large part, due to 5 year Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(MARCS) depreciation schedule, which is used for investment in renewables in the United States. In this study, I do 
not consider this lower value because such subsidies affect the distribution of costs but not the total social cost (as 








Coal w/o CCS Low-risk 11.6% 17.6% 14.6% NETL (2011)
Gas w/o CCS Low-risk 10.5% 14.9% 12.7% NETL (2011)
Nuclear High-risk 10.3% 18.8% 14.6%
Bunn et al. 
(2003)
Coal w/ CCS c High-risk 12.4% 21.4% 16.9% NETL (2011)
Gas w/ CCS c High-risk 11.1% 17.7% 14.4% NETL (2011)
Wind, solar, 
bioenergy d 
High-risk NA 9.5% 9.5%




used in this study





Figure 4-3 A.) Variation of average lending rates between 2000 and 2012 for private 
borrowers with institutional quality (The World Bank, 2013) B.) Variation of country 
risk premiums on the cost of equity with institutional quality(Damodaran, 2014; 
Fernandez et al., 2012).  Data from  Damodaran (2014) are based on the author’s 
calculations and estimates using country rating data from Moody's. Data from 
Fernandez et al. (2012) are based on elicitations of experts. The trends in these data 
show that investment risks vary inversely with the quality of institutions. The wide 
spread in the data indicates that even countries with lower quality of institutions can 
have lower interest rates for a variety of reasons. See Section 4.2.5 for a review of such 
reasons for the case of China. See also, Section 4.3.1 for explanations of the different 




Table 4-2 Investment risk scenarios explored in this study 
 
Table 4-3 Fixed charge rate assumptions (central) in scenarios explored in Chapter 4 
 
a 
Assuming that FCRs vary with institutional quality scores according to a log-linear relationship, FCRs for regions 
other than the U.S. are calculated using the following expression: 𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =  𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐴 × 𝑓 where 𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 is the FCR for 
technology i in region j and f is given by:  𝑓 =  
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑗
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝐴
 , where 𝐼𝑄𝑗  refers to the GDP-weighted institutional 
quality score for region j (Benítez et al., 2007; Erb et al., 1996). 𝛾0 and 𝛾1 are parameters of the log-linear model are 
chosen such that the spread in FCRs across GCAM regions is consistent with the spreads observed in lending rates and 
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Figure 4-4 Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry in the baseline and 
50% reduction in 2050 emissions relative to 2005. The 50% pathway is achieved by 
means of an exponentially rising carbon tax in the uniform investment risks scenario 
(Peck and Wan, 1996). The 50% pathway shown here corresponds to a cumulative CO2 
emissions (from fossil fuels and industry) budget between 2011-2050 of 1260 GtCO2. 
For comparison, the ranges of 2011-2050 cumulative CO2 emissions budgets reported 
by a range of models in the EMF-27 inter-model comparison exercise are 800-1280 
GtCO2 for the 450 ppm CO2e concentration target and 960-1480 GtCO2 for the 550 
ppm CO2e concentration target (Kriegler et al., 2014).  The same pathway is imposed 
on all investment risk scenarios.  
Note that although I assume higher investment risks in regions with inferior institutional 
qualities, exceptions exist. One important exception is China. Investment risks in China 
are lower in spite of moderate institutional quality for a variety of reasons including 
favorable policies and state-backed financial institutions (Section 4.2.5). Furthermore, 
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therefore consider a sensitivity case in which investment risks are low only in China 
(Section 4.6). Finally, in order to validate the consistency of the findings, I conduct a 
sensitivity analysis (Section 4.7) on key assumptions in Table 4-3: i.) the global 
emissions target ii.) assumptions about FCRs  and iii.) technologies considered high-risk.  
4.4. Effects of non-uniform investment risks in the baseline 
In the baseline (no climate policy) scenario with uniform investment risks, investments in 
the electricity generation sector16 occur in fossil-fuel as well as low-carbon technologies 
(Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6). Note that sums of investments in low-carbon technologies are 
comparable to those in fossil-fuel technologies, although their share in total generation 
may be much lower because the former are both intermittent and more capital intensive; 
consequently, more upfront capital is required per joule of electricity generated from low-
carbon technologies. When non-uniformities in investment risks across technologies are 
introduced, investments in low-carbon technologies decline. This is because, higher 
investment risks for low-carbon technologies (which are assigned higher costs of capital) 
raise the costs of electricity generation from them. On the other hand, costs of electricity 
generation from fossil-fuel technologies (which are assigned lower costs of capital), are 
lower. Therefore, in these scenarios, investments in fossil-fuel technologies increase 
more rapidly. Nevertheless, in spite of their higher generation costs, low-carbon 
technologies get deployed (because of the technology choice specification discussed in 
                                                 
16 Investment numbers presented in this chapter do not include transmission and distribution (T&D). 
GCAM includes a factor for T&D losses, rather than costs under the assumption that infrastructure will not 
be a roadblock to investment. This helps analyze the effects of non-uniformities in investment risks keeping 
other variables fixed. 
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the Methods section), raising electricity prices. This reduces demand for electricity, 
reducing total investment in the electricity sector. 
 
Figure 4-5 Effect of non-uniform investment risks on annual investments in electricity 
generation in India (lower institutional quality) and Canada (higher institutional 
quality) in the baseline cases. Investment numbers presented here and in other figures 
do not include transmission and distribution (T&D).  
INVESMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY TECHNOLOGY IN THE BASELINE  
(billion 2012 USD per year) 





































































































































































































































































































































Net Reduction Geothermal Solar Wind Hydro
Nuclear Biomass w/ CCS Biomass w/o CCS Gas w/ CCS Gas w/o CCS




When non-uniformities in institutional qualities are introduced, investments in low-
carbon technologies in regions with inferior institutions (where investing is more risky) 
decrease (Figure 4-5). On the other hand, in regions with superior institutions (where 
investing is less risky), investments increase. The net effect, however, is a reduction in 
investments in low-carbon technologies globally because most of the investments occur 
in developing regions such as India and China (driven by increasing demand due to 
growing population and income) which have relatively lower institutional qualities 
(Figure 4-6). The combined effect of non-uniform investment risks across technologies 
and regions is a reduction in investments in low-carbon technologies globally and an 
increase in investments in fossil-fuel technologies, leading to a net reduction in 
investments in electricity generation. The immediate consequence of such a shift in 












Figure 4-6 Global average annual investments in electricity generation in the baseline 
under the different investment risk scenarios.  
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Figure 4-7 CO2 emissions in the baseline (no-climate policy) scenarios. With non-
uniform investment risks across technologies, baseline emissions are higher compared 
with the uniform investment risks scenario in all regions. This is because, in this 
scenario, deployments of low-carbon technologies are lower and those of fossil-fuel 
technologies are higher. When non-uniformities across regions are introduced, 
baseline emissions in regions with lower institutional qualities, for example, India are 
higher due to the effects described above. On the other hand, baseline emissions in 
regions with higher institutional qualities, for example, Canada, are lower. This is 
because, in these regions, deployments of low-carbon technologies increase and those 
of fossil-fuel technologies decrease (see Figure 4-5)). The combined effect of non-
uniformities across technologies and regions is to increase baseline emissions in 
regions with inferior institutions and decrease them in regions with superior 
institutions. On the global level, the combined effect is an increase in baseline 
emissions as most of the emissions come from developing regions such as India and 





4.5. Effects of non-uniform investment risks under an emissions 
mitigation target 
The 50% global emissions target is achieved through a global price on carbon. In the 
presence of a high enough carbon price, the modeled energy system undergoes a dramatic 
transformation, resulting in a realignment of investment patterns in the electricity 
generation sector (Figure 4-8). Low-carbon technologies become cost-competitive 
relative to fossil-fuel technologies, leading not only to an increase in investments in the 
former, but also to a net increase in investment in electricity generation relative to the 
baseline scenario (Chaturvedi et al., 2014). Under uniform investment risks, most of the 
investments occur in developing regions such as China (Figure 4-9 A). This is because, 
investment depends on the mitigation potential of different regions. In the baseline, 
fossil-fuel based electricity generation in regions such as China increases significantly 
due to growing population and income. Consequently, it is cheaper to invest in emissions 
reductions in such regions and such regions undertake more emissions mitigation. 
When non-uniformities in investment risks across technologies are introduced, carbon 
prices required to meet the emissions target increase due to two effects (Figure 4-10).  
First, under non-uniform investment risks, since global baseline emissions are higher, 
abatement required to achieve the same target is higher. This implies a movement along 
the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve, implying higher carbon prices. The second 
and the larger effect is that the MAC curve shifts upward because of higher costs of 
capital for investment in low-carbon technologies, increasing carbon prices further. When 
non-uniformities across regions are introduced, MAC curves for regions such as China 
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and India with lower institutional qualities shift upward and MAC curves for regions 
such as Canada with higher institutional qualities shift downward (Figure 4-11, Figure 
4-12). However the global MAC curve shifts further upward because most of the 
emissions mitigation occurs in regions such as China and India with lower institutional 




Figure 4-8 Global average annual investments in electricity generation under the 50% 
global emissions target and different investment risk scenarios.  
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Figure 4-9 A.) Cumulative net present values of investments in electricity generation 
(2020-2050) under uniform investment risks by region and B.) Changes (with respect 
to the uniform investment risks scenario) in investments under the different investment 
risk scenarios considered in this study. The cases presented here correspond to the 50% 
global emissions target. When non-uniformities in investment risks across technologies 
are introduced, investments are reduced in all regions. When non-uniformities across 
regions are introduced, investments in regions with inferior institutions are reduced 
and those in regions with superior institutions are increased. Note that while the effects 
of non-uniformities across technologies and institutions reinforce each other in 
regions with inferior institutions, they act in opposite directions in regions with 
superior institutions. 
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Figure 4-10 Global carbon price pathways to achieve the 50% global emissions target 
under the different investment risk scenarios. Under non-uniform investment risks 








Figure 4-11 Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for India (lower institutional 
quality) in 2050 to achieve the 50% global emissions target under the different 
investment risk scenarios. When non-uniformities in investment risks across 
technologies are introduced, the MAC curve shifts upward as costs of capital for 
investing in low-carbon technologies in this scenario are higher.  When non-
uniformities in institutional qualities are introduced, the MAC curve shifts upward as 
investing in India is high risk and costs of capital for investing in low-carbon 
technologies are higher. Thus, when non-uniformities across technologies and 
institutional qualities are combined, technology and institutional risks reinforce each 





Figure 4-12 Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for Canada (higher institutional 
quality) in 2050 to achieve the 50% global emissions target under the different 
investment risk scenarios. When non-uniformities in investment risks across 
technologies are introduced, the MAC curve shifts upward as costs of capital for 
investing in low-carbon technologies in this scenario are higher.  When non-
uniformities in institutional qualities are introduced, the MAC curve shifts downward 
as investing in Canada is low-risk and costs of capital for investing in low-carbon 
technologies are lower. Thus, when non-uniformities across technologies and 
institutional qualities are combined, technology and institutional risks cancel each 





Figure 4-13 2050 global marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves to achieve the 50% 
global emissions target under the different investment risk scenarios. When non-









The increased carbon prices significantly alter investment patterns (Figure 4-8 B-D). 
Compared with the case with uniform investment risks, investments in bio-CCS increase.  
This is because bio-CCS is a negative emissions technology, so higher carbon prices in 
these scenarios shift the economic advantage towards bio-CCS. However, similar to the 
baseline scenario, investments in other low-carbon technologies decrease. Nevertheless, 
such technologies get deployed (because of the logit technology choice specification), 
raising electricity prices and reducing demand for electricity by end-use sectors (Figure 
4-14). As a result, overall electricity generation is lower, reducing not only investments in 
individual low-carbon technologies, but also total investment in the electricity sector. 
These effects apply to all regions, reducing power sector investments throughout the 
globe.  
The effect of non-uniformities across regions in the climate policy scenarios is similar to 
the baseline scenario. Investments in regions with inferior institutions decrease and those 
in regions with superior institutions increase, with a net reduction in global investments 
(Figure 4-8). The combined effect of non-uniformities across technologies and regions is 
therefore a change in investment relative to the uniform investment risks scenario that is 
disproportionate across regions (Figure 4-9 B, Figure 4-15 A). Investments in regions 
with inferior institutions decrease by as much as 60% and those in regions with superior 







Figure 4-14 Global final energy consumption under the 50% global emissions target 
and the different investment risk scenarios. Under non-uniform investment risks, 
electricity becomes an expensive fuel, reducing demand for electricity by end-use 
sectors. The climate target is then achieved by reduction in energy demand and 
expansion of bio-CCS in the electricity sector. 
As emissions mitigation is proportional to investment, regions with superior institutions 
mitigate more and regions with inferior institutions mitigate less compared with the 
uniform investment risks scenario (Figure 4-15 B). As explained earlier, the direct effect 
of lower investment risks in regions with superior institutions is to reduce marginal 
abatement costs in such regions (as costs of capital for investment in such regions are 
lower). Consequently, investments in regions with superior institutions increase to 
achieve cost-effective global mitigation and such regions undertake more mitigation 
compared with the uniform investment risks scenario. Because emissions mitigation is a 
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public good, increased mitigation in regions with superior institutions results in lower 
mitigation in regions with inferior institutions. As a result, increases in mitigation costs 
(mitigation cost is calculated as the area under the marginal abatement cost curve and 
measures the loss in both consumer and producer surplus under a carbon policy but not 
the surplus gains through avoided climate damages (Calvin et al., 2009)) are higher for 
regions with superior institutions (Figure 4-15 C). In other words, although the global 
cost of achieving the stringent emissions mitigation target under non-uniform investment 
risks is higher compared with the uniform investment risks scenario (Figure 4-10), most 
of the increase is borne by regions with superior institutions.  
4.6. Low investment risks in China 
In the analysis presented so far, I have assumed higher investment risks in countries with 
inferior institutions. However, it is evident from the above discussion on China’s 
investment climate that exceptions exist. China is an interesting case to investigate 
because of the large size of the market in addition to the above characteristics. I therefore 
consider a scenario in which investment risks are low only in China. When investment 
risks are low only in China, China’s mitigation costs are higher compared with the 
uniform investment risk scenario (Figure 4-16). This is again because of the public goods 
effects of technologies explained previously – due to lower investment risks, marginal 
abatement costs in China are lower. Consequently, China undertakes more abatement 
relative to the uniform investment risks scenario. On the other hand, global mitigation 
costs remain unchanged because higher mitigation in China is offset by lower mitigation 
and hence, lower mitigation costs in rest of the world. An important caveat to the findings 
of this study in general and the China experiment in particular is that I do not account for 
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domestic incentives such as technological leadership, comparative advantages and energy 
security to invest in technologies. This caveat notwithstanding, the above experiment 
illustrates that achieving a long-term climate goal is a global priority, international 
implications of domestic policies meant to encourage domestic investment- such as the 
financial incentives in China- will be an important driver of domestic costs. 
 
Figure 4-15 Changes (with respect to the uniform investment risks scenario) in A.) 
Investments (2020-2050) in electricity generation B.) Cumulative CO2 emissions 
mitigation relative to the baseline (2020-2050) and C.) Mitigation costs, when 
investment risks vary across technologies and regions. Mitigation costs and 
investments between 2020 and 2050 are discounted and cumulated. CO2 emissions are 
calculated only from fossil fuels and industry. The cases presented here correspond to 
the 50% global emissions target. 
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Figure 4-16 Mitigation costs for A.) China and B.) Globe under the 50% global 
emissions target when investment risks are lower only in China. When investment risks 
are lower only in China, marginal abatement costs for China decrease (as costs of 
capital for investment in China are lower). On the other hand, overall investment in 
China increases as emissions reduction is a public good. This increases mitigation 
costs for China in spite of lower investment risks.  
4.7. Sensitivity analyses 
The analysis so far leads to two key findings. First, under non-uniform investment risks, 
global costs of achieving a climate target are higher compared with a world with uniform 
investment risks (Figure 4-10). Second, compared with a world with uniform investment 
risks, regions with superior institutions mitigate more and regions with inferior 
institutions mitigate less (Figure 4-15). In order to check the consistency of these 
findings, I conduct sensitivity analyses on the following key assumptions (Table 4-4): i.) 
the global emissions target ii.) assumptions about FCRs (FCRs for low-risk technologies 
















































For the sake of presentation of results of the sensitivity analyses, I focus on two metrics 
that summarize the key findings, namely, changes in global carbon prices and cumulative 
CO2 emissions mitigation (from fossil fuels and industry) under variation of investment 
risks across technologies and regions relative to uniform investment risks scenarios.   
Table 4-4 Scenarios for sensitivity analyses 
 
a 
Low-carbon technologies include nuclear, renewables, CCS and bioenergy 
b 
Assuming that FCRs vary with institutional quality scores according to a log-linear relationship, FCRs for 
regions other than the U.S. are calculated using the following expression: 𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =  𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐴 × 𝑓 where 
𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗 is the FCR for technology i in region j and f is given by:  𝑓 =  
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑗
𝛾0+𝛾1 ln 𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝐴
 , where 𝐼𝑄𝑗   refers to the 
GDP-weighted institutional quality score for region j (Benítez et al., 2007; Erb et al., 1996). 𝛾0 and 𝛾1 are 
parameters of the log-linear model are chosen such that the spread in FCRs across GCAM regions is 
consistent with the spreads observed in lending rates and equity risk premiums in Figure 4-3. 
4.7.1. Sensitivity on global emissions target 
In central analysis conducted in this chapter, I specified a 50% reduction in 2050 global 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry relative to 2005 levels. For the purpose of 
sensitivity analysis, I consider 25% and 75% reductions. Global carbon prices under the 
Global emissions 
reduction target
(2050 global  CO2 
emissions from fossil 
fuels and industry with 
respect to 2005 levels)
50% reduction target
FCR:13-17
Low carbon: high risk
25% reduction target 25% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 13% 4% 17% X f  b
75% reduction target 75% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 13% 4% 17% X f  b
FCR:10-14 50% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 10% 4% 14% X f  b
FCR:16-20 50% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 16% 4% 20% X f  b
FCR:13-15 50% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 13% 2% 15% X f  b
FCR:13-19 50% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 13% 6% 19% X f  b
Fossil-fuel: high risk 50% Low-carbon a Fossil-fuel 13% 4% 17% X f  b
Sensitivity on technologies 
considered low/high risk
Sensitivity on risk premium 
for high-risk technologies
4% 17% X f b Central assumptions
Scenario
Sensitivity on global 
emissions reduction target
















50% Fossil-fuel Low-carbon a 13%
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25% and 75% targets are lower and higher respectively, compared to the 50% target 
(Figure 4-17, Figure 4-18). Nevertheless, under all global emissions targets, global 
carbon prices are higher under non-uniform investment risks and regions with superior 
institutions mitigate more. 
 
Figure 4-17 Global carbon prices in 2050 under different global emissions reductions 































Figure 4-18 Percentage changes (relative to the uniform investment risks scenarios) in 
cumulative CO2 emissions mitigation (2020-2050) relative to baseline with non-
uniform investment risks across technologies and regions, under different global 
emissions reduction targets  (see Table 4-4 for detailed assumptions). The boxes show 
the range across sensitivity cases. CO2 emissions are calculated only from fossil fuels 
and industry. 
4.7.2. Sensitivity on FCR assumptions 
The findings of this study hinge on assumptions about technology costs and fixed charge 
rates (FCRs). Previous studies have evaluated sensitivity to technology cost assumptions 
in the GCAM model (Clarke et al., 2008; McJeon et al., 2011). I focus this sensitivity 
analysis on assumptions regarding FCRs. The main analysis of this study assumes an 




















































survey of FCRs used for financial analyses in the US (Table 4-1). Uncertainties in the 
FCRs obtained for USA can arise due to a number of reasons including assumptions 
about equity/debt shares, discount rates, lifespan of investments, tax rates and 
depreciation schedules. For the sake of sensitivity analyses, I change the FCR 
assumptions for low-risk technologies and the risk premium for high-risk technologies 
(Table 4-4).  
The results indicate that changes in global and regional mitigation costs under non-
uniform investment risks relative to the uniform investment risks scenarios are more 
sensitive to assumptions about the risk premium compared to assumptions about the FCR 
for low-risk technologies (Figure 4-19, Figure 4-20). For example, the spread in changes 
in 2050 global carbon prices under variation of investment risks with technologies and 
regions relative to the uniform investment risks scenarios when the FCR for low-risk 
technologies are varied between 10% and 16% is small (changes in carbon prices across 
sensitivity cases are 21%-22). In contrast, when the risk premium for high-risk 
technologies is varied between 2% and 6%, the spread in changes in carbon prices is 
greater (changes in carbon prices across sensitivity cases are 15%-28%). This is because, 
investments in GCAM depend on relative economics of technologies. Hence, the risk 
premium for high-risk technologies has a greater influence on the competitive advantage 
of such technologies relative to low-risk technologies compared to the FCR for low-risk 
technologies. Consequently, the risk premium has a greater influence on the deployments 
of low-carbon technologies (which are high-risk) and hence on marginal abatement costs 
and carbon prices. Nevertheless, in spite of changes in the magnitudes of the impacts on 
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carbon prices and regional mitigation costs, the two key findings of this analysis are 
consistent across various assumptions about FCRs. 
 
 
Figure 4-19 Global carbon prices in 2050 under different assumptions regarding fixed 
charge rates (see Table 4-4 for detailed assumptions). The cases presented here 
correspond to the 50% global emissions target.  
4.7.3. Sensitivity on technologies considered high-risk 
In the investment risk scenarios considered so far, I specified higher investment risks for 
low-carbon technologies and lower investment risks for fossil-fuel technologies. Here, I 
consider a scenario in which investment risks are higher for fossil-fuel technologies 
compared to low-carbon technologies. Such a scenario is conceivable in a carbon-
constrained world in which a sustained and increasing price on carbon could make 
investments in fossil-fuel rather than low-carbon technologies more risky. Governments 
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done already—precisely with the ambition of making investors view these technologies 
as less risky.  
 
 
Figure 4-20 Percentage changes (relative to the uniform investment risks scenarios) in 
cumulative CO2 emissions mitigation (2020-2050) relative to baseline with non-
uniform investment risks across technologies and regions, under different FCR 
assumptions (see Table 4-4 for detailed assumptions). The boxes show the range across 
sensitivity cases. The cases presented here correspond to the 50% global emissions 
target. CO2 emissions are calculated only from fossil fuels and industry. 
The effect of higher investment risks for fossil-fuel technologies is to reduce carbon 
prices relative to the uniform investment risks scenario (Figure 4-21). This is because, 
higher investment risks for fossil-fuel technologies increase the costs of electricity 
generation from such technologies and improve the competitive advantage of low-carbon 
technologies, thus decreasing marginal abatement costs. The effect is, however, small 
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compared to the increase in carbon prices due to higher investment risks for low-carbon 
technologies. For example, the global carbon price in 2050 under higher investment risks 
for low-carbon technologies along with variation across regions to achieve a 50% 
emissions target is 22% higher compared with the uniform investment risks scenario. In 
contrast, the carbon price under higher investment risks for fossil-fuel technologies along 
with variation across regions is lower by only 3%. This is because, fossil-fuel 
technologies are less capital-intensive compared to low-carbon technologies. Hence, a 
risk premium on fossil-fuel technologies will have a smaller impact on marginal 
abatement cost curves compared with the same risk premium on low-carbon 
technologies, even if the directions of the impacts will be opposite.  
 
Figure 4-21 Global carbon prices in 2050 when A.) investment risks for renewables, 
nuclear, CCS and bioenergy are higher compared to fossil-fuel technologies and B.) 
investment risks for fossil-fuel technologies are higher compared to renewables, 
























Achieving stringent climate targets will require a dramatic transformation of the energy 
system, requiring large scale investments in the energy sector. Previous assessments of 
emissions mitigation patterns have acknowledged the huge variation in real-world factors 
that affect where, how and at what costs firms deploy capital. However, most studies 
mention these issues in passing, and then proceeded to analyze an idealized situation that 
ignores these factors, even though they can be determinative in terms of outcomes 
(Calvin et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2009; Kriegler et al., 2014; McCollum et al., 2013; 
Riahi et al., 2015). This essay reviews the factors that can affect investors’ assessments of 
risks, leading to a wide variation in the business climate for investment and uses an 
integrated assessment model to analyze the implications of heterogeneity in investment 
risks for the costs and geography of climate change mitigation. I find that a more nuanced 
representation of investments in the electricity generation sector—in which perceived 
risks vary significantly across technologies and regions changes our understanding of 
emissions mitigation in two important ways. First, achieving an emissions mitigation goal 
is more expensive than it would be in a world with uniform investment risks- the 
ubiquitous assumption in modeling emissions mitigation Second, regions with inferior 
institutions mitigate less and regions with superior institutions mitigate more – not driven 
by any policy decision but because markets make emissions mitigation more difficult in 
regions with inferior institutions.   
The above findings have implications for policy and as well as research. For policy 
makers, the findings of this study suggest that major efforts to improve the institutional 
environment for investment—and thus lower risks—need to be essential elements of a 
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larger strategy for cutting emissions globally cost effectively.  Those efforts are well 
known in the study of foreign investment and include improved enforcement of contracts, 
more transparent and reliable regulation, and more effective international rules and 
offshore arbitration for investors.  It is plausible that institutional reforms may even be 
more important than technology-focused policies.  And more importantly, absent such 
reforms, mitigation effort could be disproportionately focused on countries where 
investment risks are lower.   
For analysts, this study provides an illustration of methods that could be used to improve 
how real world investment risks could be reflected in the modeling of emissions 
mitigation. This work, along with a suite of other studies, suggests that real-world factors 
affecting investments in technology are important for assessing emissions mitigation 
patterns (Iyer et al., 2015a). Future research might decompose each of these factors 
individually—to assess their relative importance and the impact of policy efforts to 
address them.  
There are several caveats to the findings of this study. First, although many paradigms to 
compare mitigation efforts across regions have been put forth in the literature, I present 
results for equal marginal abatement cost because it provides a baseline for comparison 
with many previous analyses, and also because the approach internalizes the public goods 
characteristics of investments in technology (den Elzen et al., 2010). The actual 
distribution of investments would depend on the policies and mechanisms used 
domestically and internationally (for example, domestic policies to encourage technology 
deployment, offset crediting programs, etc.). Second, I assume that institutional qualities 
are constant over time. Competitive forces in the continuous interaction between 
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institutions and organizations could drive institutional change. However, the process may 
be slow and path-dependent due to economies of scale and network externalities, or rapid 
because of political upheavals (North, 2008). Finally, I do not consider availability of 
energy efficiency options and mitigation from land-use changes to retain focus on the 
effects of non-uniformities in investment risks in the electricity generation sector, 
keeping other variables fixed. A detailed examination of the implications of non-uniform 




Chapter 5 Conclusions 
5.1. Summary of the dissertation and key findings  
Climate change is one of the most important challenges facing the international 
community today. There is wide acknowledgement by scholars that development and 
diffusion of low-carbon technologies will be critical elements of mitigating climate 
change. This dissertation aims to illuminate the relationships between low-carbon 
technology diffusion and climate change mitigation policy under three “imperfect” 
circumstances, namely, constraints on the rate of diffusion of low-carbon technologies, 
countries promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies based on national 
priorities and preferences and variation in investment risks across technologies and 
regions. I call such circumstances “imperfect” in comparison to previous assessments of 
global climate change mitigation technology and policy issues that have relied on 
idealized assumptions about technology availability and deployment, regional mitigation 
efforts and capacities to undertake those efforts.  
The three essays together contribute in two important ways. The first contribution is 
methodological, providing future analysts, solid frameworks to incorporate real-world 
factors and policies in assessments related to technology and climate change mitigation 
policy. The second, equally important contribution is to provide policy relevant insights. 
This chapter provides a summary of key findings and policy implications of the three 
essays and directions for future research. In short, the research presented in this 
dissertation asserts, along with a suite of other studies, the importance of careful 
considerations of processes that influence technological change, and more importantly, 
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factors that affect technology diffusion and investment while designing domestic and 
international policies to mitigate climate change cost-effectively. 
5.1.1. Low-carbon technology diffusion rates 
The first essay focuses on the importance of diffusion rates of low-carbon technologies 
for the costs and feasibility of achieving stringent long-term climate goals. A number of 
factors including technology market failures and institutional, behavioral, and social 
factors constrain the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, even in the presence of 
favorable emissions mitigation policies. Such factors could impact the timing as well as 
the costs and feasibility of achieving stringent climate targets. In addition, international 
negotiations have a history of slow movement. And such slow movements might delay 
national action because international agreements are important in bolstering national 
action. If such delays in international action continue, global mitigation levels could 
continue to lag behind ideal rates. This essay reviews the factors that constrain the 
deployment of low-carbon technologies and addresses the following questions. First, how 
do these constraints impact the cost and feasibility of achieving long-term climate 
targets? Second, how do these impacts change in the presence of delays in global 
mitigation action? The analysis shows that factors constraining the diffusion of low-
carbon technologies may not be critically important without major delays in policy 
action. However, if political action is delayed by a few decades, these factors have 
greater influence on the feasibility of achieving stringent climate stabilization targets. In 
addition, diffusion constraints become particularly important under delays when multiple 
technologies are jointly constrained.  
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The first essay lays out a simple approach to understand the impacts of slow diffusion of 
low-carbon technologies on the costs and feasibility of achieving low-carbon 
technologies. This is in contrast to previous studies that have either prohibited the 
construction of new capacity for some technologies, such as renewables and nuclear, 
completely excluded technologies (e.g., CCS) or capped their maximum deployment 
(e.g., bioenergy) (Edenhofer et al., 2010; Luderer et al., 2012; Richels et al., 2007; 
Tavoni et al., 2012).  
In addition, this essay highlights important lessons for policy. To the extent that the 
international community is focused on achieving stringent long-term climate goals, 
policies to encourage technology deployment would play an important role, especially in 
the near-term. For instance, the results of the analysis showed that achieving a 550 ppm 
CO2e target by the end of the century with stringent diffusion rate constraints on low-
carbon technologies is infeasible within the specifications of the model.17 And such 
infeasibilities increase with the stringency of the climate target (for example, achieving a 
450 ppm target) and under delays in political action.  Under moderate diffusion rate 
constraints, achieving such targets might be feasible – however, costs of achieving the 
targets are significantly higher. Thus, if achieving stringent long-term climate targets 
cost-effectively is a policy goal, the results of this analysis underscore the importance of 
policy incentives to encourage and speed up the adoption of such technologies. Indeed, 
such policies exist throughout the world. Examples of such policies include renewable 
portfolio standards (which is prevalent in many US states and some European countries), 
                                                 
17 Infeasibility can be thought of as excessively high mitigation costs, where a large part of the mitigation 




feed-in-tariffs (common in majority of European countries, Australia, Canada and some 
developing countries), exempting energy taxes on low-carbon technologies, production 
tax credits and subsidies (for example for nuclear power in the US).  
An important insight from this essay is that constraints to the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies such as might exist even in the presence of favorable policies. However, it 
may be likely that diffusion rates are not constrained as severely as this chapter assumes, 
particularly for technologies such as wind and photovoltaics. For example, among other 
factors, economies of scale and ease of installation might ease the stringency of diffusion 
rate constraints for photovoltaic technologies. It is important to note that I explored a 
range of scenarios in which I imposed not only different levels of diffusion rate 
constraints but also considered constraints on different sets of low-carbon technologies. 
Also, the constraints considered in this chapter are meant to capture among others, 
institutional, behavioral and social factors that might limit diffusion rates even in the 
presence of favorable technology characteristics and policies (Hultman et al., 2012). The 
results from these scenarios should, therefore, not be seen as only showing the increasing 
difficulty of mitigation in the presence of diffusion rate constraints, but also viewed as 
highlighting the importance of addressing them.  
In a broad sense, the analysis in this chapter highlights the importance of policies that are 
aimed at developing institutions, disseminating information, encouraging technology 
demonstration and developing flexible regulations intended to address broader 
institutional, behavioral, and social constraints that might severely limit the rate of 
138 
 
deployment of certain low-carbon technologies.18 Such efforts might be required on top 
of “demand-pull” policy instruments such as those mentioned above or other market-
based policy instruments such as carbon price based mechanisms that are meant to 
correct only market failures and do not necessarily address other institutional, behavioral, 
and social issues.  
5.1.2. Divergence between domestic and global long-term outcomes 
The results of the first essay indicated the importance of deployment policies intended to 
encourage and speed up the adoption of low-carbon technologies, especially in the near-
term. Indeed, many countries view promoting the deployment of specific low-carbon 
technologies as an alternative to economy-wide carbon price based mechanisms. 
Promoting the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term involves a cost – 
but at the same time, it could pay off in the long-term. For example, promoting the 
deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term leads to additional emissions 
mitigation in the near-term, leading to reductions in long-term mitigation costs– simply 
because the more mitigation that is achieved in the near-term, the less that would have to 
be undertaken in the presence of a climate goal in the long-term. Promoting the 
deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term could also lead to improvements 
in technology costs – further reducing long-term mitigation costs. However, the near-
term abatement as well as technological change effects described above have public 
goods characteristics. Therefore, what is cost-effective globally may not be so, from the 
perspective of individual countries promoting the technologies in the near-term.  
                                                 
18 While Chapter 3 did not make an attempt to separate out the effects of various factors, the analysis 
presented in Chapter 4 is a step in that direction. 
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The second essay illustrated this divergence in long-term domestic and global outcomes. 
I showed that under certain assumptions about technological change, the globally cost-
effective strategy in terms of achieving a long-term climate goal is a diversified approach 
in which different countries invest in promoting different technologies. This is because, 
in a diversified approach, advances in more emissions abatement technologies may spill 
over to the globe and that leads to reduced mitigation costs globally. In contrast, under a 
hypothetical scenario in which all countries pursued the same technology, such spillovers 
would be largely redundant and the impact on global mitigation costs would be smaller. 
However, under the same technological change assumptions, the cost-effective strategy 
from the perspective of individual countries is to invest in currently mature and cheaper 
technologies – even if other domestic payoffs such as early-mover advantages through 
technological leadership, increased exports and employment benefits are taken into 
account. This divergence in global and domestic occurs because public goods 
characteristics of technologies combined with differences in near-term costs of promoting 
different technologies create incentives to free-ride. In other words, from the domestic 
perspective, countries are better off promoting the deployment of currently mature and 
cheaper technologies domestically and free-riding on the benefits of other countries 
promoting more expensive technologies. Consequently, under equilibrium, countries 
would prefer to invest in currently dominant alternatives and that might not lead to the 
globally cost-effective outcome. However, the analysis presented in the essay also 
showed that if deployment policies lead to sufficiently rapid technological improvements 
that spill over globally, domestic outcomes may align with the global outcome. That is, if 
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technological change induced by deployment policies is sufficiently rapid, the domestic 
outcome could shift to a diversified approach.  
An important contribution of this essay is that it lays out a framework to analyze the 
long-term payoffs of near-term low-carbon deployment policies. By introducing payoff 
matrices, the analysis illustrates the divergence in domestic and global outcomes if 
countries were to promote the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term. 
The above findings also suggest implications for international and domestic policy. The 
analysis illustrates that if countries negotiate with each other and make decisions on low-
carbon technology deployments driven by domestic economic benefits alone, such 
decisions are likely to tilt toward currently cheaper alternatives. On the other hand, to the 
extent that the international community is looking toward achieving a long-term climate 
goal cost-effectively, international diffusion of diverse low-carbon technologies – not just 
current dominant alternatives – will be required. In other words, there are substantial 
gains to international cooperation in the development and diffusion of diverse low-carbon 
technologies. More broadly, the findings of this essay argue for international cooperation 
mechanisms to include a diverse set of markets and institutions beyond those explicitly 
related to climate, including those for trade, development, and intellectual property 
(Newell, 2010). International cooperation in research and development of low-carbon 
technologies is not new (de Coninck et al., 2008). A step in that direction is the U.S.-
China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC, 2015). A broader international cooperation 
will require reconciliation of differences in controversial issues such as international 
trade and intellectual property rights and careful considerations of their interactions with 
domestic policies. Such cooperation will be all the more important to induce faster rates 
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of technological change and increase spillovers – which will be instrumental in aligning 
domestic policy objectives with international goals and also avoid globally ineffective 
outcomes. 
5.1.3. Non-uniform investment risks  
Technology-focused policies such as deployment policies and emissions-focused 
policies, such a carbon tax do not directly address the important issue of the huge capital 
investment required for the deployment of low-carbon technologies. A number of factors 
such as the quality of public and private institutions, sector and technology specific risks 
and firm-level characteristics can affect investors’ perceptions of risks creating a wide 
variation in the business climate for investment. Such heterogeneity in investment risks 
can have important implications as investors respond to risks by expecting higher returns 
for riskier projects, delaying or forgoing investments and preferring to invest in existing, 
familiar technologies. The third essay answered the following question: How does 
heterogeneity in investment risks influence the cost and geography of climate change 
mitigation? This essay represented the variation in investment risks across technologies 
and regions in the electricity generation sector - a pivotally important sector in most 
assessments of climate change mitigation (Clarke et al., 2014) - and explored the impact 
on the magnitude and distribution of mitigation costs.  This modified representation of 
investment risks has two major effects. First, achieving an emissions mitigation goal is 
more expensive than it would be in a world with uniform investment risks.  Second, 
industrialized countries mitigate more, and developing countries mitigate less.  
142 
 
This essay introduced a methodology that illustrates how real world investment risks can 
be incorporated in models of emissions mitigation and provides evidence for the 
importance of such factors in assessments of the costs and distribution of emissions 
mitigation patterns. The results of this essay also have implications for policy. The 
findings of this essay suggest that major efforts to improve the institutional environment 
for investment—and thus lower risks—need to be essential elements of a larger strategy 
for cutting global emissions cost-effectively. Absent such reforms, mitigation effort could 
be disproportionately focused on countries where investment risks are lower.   
Efforts to bring about institutional changes to encourage investment are well known in 
the study of foreign investment. For example, scholars have emphasized the importance 
of protection of investor rights in encouraging foreign investment. When investors 
finance firms, they typically obtain certain rights or powers that are generally protected 
through the enforcement of regulations and laws. Some of these rights include disclosure 
and accounting rules, which provide investors with the information they need to exercise 
other rights. Protected shareholder rights include those to vote for directors, participate in 
shareholders’ meetings, sue directors for suspected expropriation, etc. Laws protecting 
creditors largely deal with bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, and include 
measures that enable creditors to repossess collateral, to protect their seniority, and to 
make it harder for firms to seek court protection in reorganization (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Protecting investor rights and contract enforcement through corporate governance reform 
would require radical changes in the legal systems of many countries, requiring 
amendments of   securities, company, and bankruptcy laws. Such reform could lead to 
several benefits including the expansion of financial markets, facilitating access to 
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foreign financing for new firms and improved efficiency of investment allocation (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Examples of international initiatives in these directions include Power 
Africa, the International Finance Corporation, Sustainable energy for All and a host of 
other “public-private partnerships”.  
The findings of this essay indicate that in the context of international climate change 
mitigation policy, it is plausible that institutional reforms to bring about institutional 
change and reduce such transaction costs may even be more important than technology-
focused policies.  What compounds the issue, however, is that institutional change is 
extremely path dependent – those who make policy and design institutions have a stake in 
the framework they created and resist changes that may rob them of power or property 
(Shirley, 2008). Sudden institutional changes may occur for example, under a revolution 
or a political upheaval; however, unless beliefs and norms also change, it is questionable 
whether such sudden changes will stick on. It is particularly important to note that due to 
path dependency and the stickiness of beliefs and norms, institutional change cannot be 
brought about by simply importing institutions that were successful in other countries 
(Shirley, 2008).  
5.2. Important caveats  
Although I discuss the caveats to the research presented in this dissertation in chapters 
containing the individual essays, some general assumptions merit further discussion. 
First, throughout the dissertation, I have used one model, namely GCAM to understand 
the relationships between technology and policy in the context of climate change 
mitigation under imperfect circumstances. While this is an important caveat, the insights 
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from the research presented in this dissertation are fundamental and based on basic 
principles. Hence, the broad qualitative insights from this dissertation are solid and will 
remain unchanged even if other modeling frameworks are used to answer similar 
questions. That said, future studies exploring similar issues might perform inter-model 
comparisons to check the robustness of the quantitative results presented in this 
dissertation.  
Second, I have assumed that action against climate change follows the equal marginal 
abatement cost rule wherein an emissions mitigation target is achieved by means of a 
global carbon price that is uniform across regions and various sectors of the economy. 
This assumption has implications, particularly in discussions surrounding long-term 
payoffs from reduced mitigation costs in Chapter 3 and the distribution of mitigation 
costs in Chapter 4. Although many paradigms to compare mitigation efforts across 
regions have been put forth in the literature, I consider this approach because it provides a 
baseline for comparison with many previous analyses, and also because the approach 
internalizes the public goods characteristics of investments in technology (den Elzen et 
al., 2010). The actual distribution of investments and mitigation costs would depend on 
the policies and mechanisms used domestically and internationally (for example, 
domestic policies to encourage technology deployment, offset crediting programs, etc.). 
That said, I do consider deployment policies in the near-term rather than an idealized 
carbon-price based mechanism for the analyses presented in Chapter 3. This is an 
important methodological contrast to previous studies based on energy-economic models 
that have explored the economics of “sub-optimal” near-term policies or “benefits of 
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early action” – such studies have mostly represented near-term action as an economy-
wide price on carbon (Bosetti et al., 2009a; Bosetti et al., 2009b; Jakob et al., 2012).  
Third, all the essays in this dissertation focus on the electricity generation sector mainly 
because this sector has been identified as particularly critical in previous assessments of 
climate change mitigation policy (Clarke et al., 2014). This has implications for the 
impacts of diffusion rate constraints and non-uniform investment risks on mitigation 
costs presented in Chapters 2 and 4 respectively. All the essays are comparative static 
analyses and restriction of the analyses to one sector helped retain focus on the 
interactions between variables of interest, keeping others fixed. Future studies on related 
themes should consider investigating the effects of such factors on sectors other than 
electricity generation.  
Finally, I used simple input-output representations of institutional, behavioral, and social 
factors in Chapter 2. The assumption is that such factors tend to slow down diffusion and 
I represented the effects of such factors in the form of diffusion rate constraints. Although 
this is an important methodological contribution in itself (compared to studies that 
prohibit the construction of new capacity, completely exclude technologies or cap their 
maximum deployment), future studies should incorporate structural representations of 
such factors to gain more insight on the interaction among various factors that limit 
diffusion and differences of their impacts across regions and sectors.  
5.3. Future research directions 
The above caveats lend themselves to a number of avenues for future research. First, as 
pointed out earlier, it would be useful for future studies to include sectors other than 
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electricity generation in analyses intended to understand the impacts of various frictions 
on costs and patterns of emissions mitigation. Investment patterns in other sectors might 
be quite different compared to the electricity sector and might require detailed 
examination.  For example, investments in electricity generation are mostly domestic; 
that may not be the case in the transportation sector where fuels and vehicles may be 
imported rather than produced domestically. Likewise, investments in and diffusion of 
energy efficient technologies in buildings and households may be influenced by a range 
of factors in ways that may be different from supply-side sectors (see for example, Jaffe 
et al. (1993) and Jaffe and Stavins (1994) that discuss principal-agent problems 
influencing investments in energy efficient technologies). Similarly, investments in some 
sectors may primarily be self-financed by firms or individuals rather than through 
commercial or development institutions.  
Second, future studies should represent institutional, behavioral, and social factors 
structurally to gain more insight on their impacts on investment and technology diffusion. 
This will be particularly important to understand the differences of such impacts across 
various regions and sectors. A step in that direction is the representation of one such 
factor —non-uniform investment risks in Chapter 4. However, that analysis considered 
only one variable, namely the cost of capital that is influenced by institutional qualities. 
Future studies should explore the effect of institutional quality on other variables such as 
infrastructure, project execution times and investment approvals. Future research might 
also decompose each of these factors individually—to understand how they interact, 
assess their relative importance across regions and sectors and the impact of policy 
efforts to address them.  
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Third, the essay on the divergence between domestic and global outcomes when 
countries promote the deployment of low-carbon technologies in the near-term based on 
national priorities and preferences does not address an important question on whether 
such deployment policies pay off for the investor countries investing in such policies. In 
other words, do long-term payoffs of near-term deployment policies become greater than 
one? If so, under what conditions? In a companion paper, I explore these questions in 
detail. A broad message that emerges out of an initial analysis based on the example 
considered in this essay is that whether such policies will payoff for investor countries 
would depend on a range of factors including the type of technologies deployed in the 
rest of the world; presence and nature of technological change, spillovers and also other 
benefits such as early-mover advantages and energy security.  
Finally, the research presented in this dissertation raises an important question on what 
issues countries should focus on, in the near-term. Chapter 3 recognizes that countries are 
increasingly approaching climate change mitigation from a bottom-up perspective, at 
least in the near-term. That chapter provides a framework to think about long-term 
payoffs of one particular type of near-term “bottom-up” effort, namely policies to 
promote the deployment of low-carbon technologies. In contrast, the analyses presented 
in Chapters 2 and 4 (along with previous studies) highlight the importance of market 
failures in technology markets as well as non-market barriers (such as institutional, 
behavioral, and social factors) that tend to limit investments in and diffusion of low-
carbon technologies in influencing the costs of achieving stringent climate change 
mitigation targets. What, then, should countries focus on in the near-term: promote the 
deployment and diffusion of low-carbon technologies in the near-term or improve 
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domestic capabilities – such as the institutional environment in which such technologies 
are expected to diffuse? Do these issues have common areas of intersection? What kind 
of policies could address these issues?  Future research analyzing the inter-linkages 
between these issues will be an important contribution to policy debates because such 
issues could potentially influence not only global costs of achieving long-term climate 
goals, but also the ability of countries to maximize national benefits associated with 




Appendix A: Author contributions in the three essays of this 
dissertation 
Chapters 2, and 4 of this dissertation led to publications as co-authored articles in peer-
reviewed journals. Chapter 3 is submitted for publication. 
For Chapter  2 (Iyer et al., 2015a), a round table comprising of Gokul Iyer, Nathan 
Hultman, Jiyong Eom, Leon Clarke and Haewon McJeon discussed the research question 
and designed the experiments. Gokul Iyer conducted all the experiments and wrote the 
first draft. The co-authors assisted in writing, further developing the argument, and 
refining the final version of the paper. Pralit Patel provided assistance in GCAM coding. 
For Chapter 3 (submitted), a round table comprising of Gokul Iyer, Nathan Hultman, 
Leon Clarke and James Edmonds discussed the research question and designed the 
experiments. Gokul Iyer conducted all the experiments and wrote the first draft. The 
above co-authors assisted in writing, further developing the argument, and refining the 
final version of the paper. 
For Chapter  4 (Iyer et al., 2015b), a round table comprising of Gokul Iyer, Nathan 
Hultman, Leon Clarke, James Edmonds, Brian Flannery, David Victor and Haewon 
McJeon discussed the research question and designed the experiments. Gokul Iyer 
conducted all the experiments and wrote the first draft. The above co-authors assisted in 
writing, further developing the argument, and refining the final version of the paper.   
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Appendix B: Derivation of growth rates in percentage per year 
from studies using S-curve  
Studies looking at historical growth rates of technologies have used two types of metrics 
to analyze the dynamics of growth. In the first metric used by Hook et al. (2012), growth 
is defined as the percentage change from one point in time to the next. Mathematically, if 
f(t) denotes the output of a technology at time t, and g(t)denotes the annual growth rate at 




In the second metric used by Grübler et al. (1999), Wilson et al. (2012) and Wilson and 
Grübler (2011), historical growths of technologies are modeled as logistic (S-shaped) 
growth functions. The time ∆t required for the technologies to grow from 10% to 90% of 
the market is then used to describe the development of technologies over time. The 
estimates of Grübler et al. (1999), Wilson and Grübler (2011) and Wilson et al. (2012) 
can be expressed in terms of annual percentage growth as follows.  
Let us assume that the growth trajectory of a technology during the period when its 
market share is between 10% and 90% is linear and of the form f(t) = mt +c.19 The 
annual growth rate g(t) at time t in percentage is then given as 𝑔(𝑡) =
𝑓′(𝑡)
𝑓(𝑡)
=  100 ×
𝑚
𝑚𝑡+𝑐
. The average annual growth rate (y) in percentage in the time interval from t0 to 
t0+∆t, where t0 is the time at which the market share is 10% and t0+∆t is the time at which 









 which is 
                                                 
19 The above studies do not specify the functional form of the S-curve trajectories. In the absence of that 
information, I make the approximation that the growth is linear during the time at which technologies grow 









. Since 𝑓((𝑡0 + ∆𝑡) = 𝑚(𝑡0 + ∆𝑡) + 𝑐 = 90% and  𝑓((𝑡0) =




Appendix C: Representation of technology costs in Chapter 3 
In this analysis, technology costs are represented as exponential functions of time. Costs 
of advanced technologies decrease at higher rates compared to reference technologies. In 
scenarios with delayed spillovers, the cost trajectory follows the reference cost trajectory 
for fifteen years and then diverges with an accelerated rate of improvement, 
asymptotically approaching advanced technology costs (Figure C-1). Following are the 





𝑐𝑑(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡)  for t < 𝑡𝑑  
           = 𝑐(𝑡0)𝑒
−𝛽𝑟𝑡𝑑   𝑒−𝛽𝑑(𝑡−𝑡𝑑)  for t ≥ 𝑡𝑑 
where 𝛽𝑑 is obtained as follows: 








t  is the time from starting year 
t0 is the starting year of cost functions 
𝑐(𝑡0)  is the initial cost in the starting year t0 same for all cases 
𝛽𝑟  is the percent rate of improvement in reference technology costs per year  
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T is the time interval between initial and final years  
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡)  is the cost of reference technology at time t  
𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑡)  is the cost of advanced technology at time t  
𝛽𝑎  is the percent rate of improvement in advanced technology costs per year 
𝑐𝑑(𝑡)  is the cost of delayed-advanced technology at time t 
𝑡𝑑  is the time of delay for spillovers in the delayed-advanced case (assumed to be 15 years) 
𝛽𝑑  is the percent rate of improvement in delayed-advanced technology costs per year 
Reference assumptions about 𝛽𝑟 and 𝛽𝑎 are consistent with assumptions in Clarke et al. 
(2007) and McJeon et al. (2011). I consider five sensitivity cases based on 𝛽𝑟 and 𝛽𝑎 for 
wind and solar technologies (Table 3-3).  
 














































































































Appendix D: Sensitivity of domestic outcomes in Chapter 3 to 
assumptions about rates of technological change 
 
 
Figure D-1 Domestic and global payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs 
(reductions in long-term abatement costs relative to the case without near-term 
deployment policies divided by near-term costs of deployment policies) assuming that 
reference solar technologies improve four times as fast as reference wind technologies 
and advanced wind and solar technologies improve twice as fast as reference wind and 
solar technologies respectively (see Table 3-3 for detailed assumptions). The circled 
payoffs show the Nash equilibrium under a technological change scenario.  
  
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.78 Wind 0.53 0.83 Wind 0.55 2.03 Wind 0.55 2.27
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.23 0.25 Solar 0.41 0.42 Solar 0.44 0.45
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.07 Wind 0.12 0.12 Wind 0.12 0.13
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.17 0.08 Solar 0.39 0.13 Solar 0.43 0.13
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.42 0.28 Wind 0.45 0.32 Wind 0.50 1.02 Wind 0.51 1.11
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Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.53 0.81 Wind 0.55 1.14 Wind 0.56 1.21
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.17 0.19 Solar 0.23 0.24 Solar 0.24 0.25
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.06 Wind 0.12 0.07 Wind 0.12 0.07
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.16 0.06 Solar 0.22 0.07 Solar 0.23 0.07
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.30 Wind 0.50 0.48 Wind 0.52 0.51
Solar 0.30 0.22 Solar 0.32 0.23 Solar 0.52 0.33 Solar 0.55 0.34
No Additional Technological 
Change
Faster Domestic Technological 
Improvements
Faster Technological 
Improvements and Delayed 
Spillovers
Faster Technological 
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Figure D-2 Domestic and global payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs 
(reductions in long-term abatement costs relative to the case without near-term 
deployment policies divided by near-term costs of deployment policies) assuming that 
reference solar technologies improve twice as fast as reference wind technologies and 
advanced wind and solar technologies improve four times as fast as reference wind and 
solar technologies respectively  (see Table 3-3 for detailed assumptions). The circled 
payoffs show the Nash equilibrium under a technological change scenario. 
  
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.58 0.88 Wind 0.65 2.39 Wind 0.67 2.75
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.25 0.27 Solar 0.48 0.48 Solar 0.53 0.52
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.13 0.08 Wind 0.14 0.14 Wind 0.14 0.16
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.18 0.08 Solar 0.46 0.14 Solar 0.53 0.15
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.51 0.34 Wind 0.64 1.22 Wind 0.68 1.37
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Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.53 0.81 Wind 0.55 1.14 Wind 0.56 1.21
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.17 0.19 Solar 0.23 0.24 Solar 0.24 0.25
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.06 Wind 0.12 0.07 Wind 0.12 0.07
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.16 0.06 Solar 0.22 0.07 Solar 0.23 0.07
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.30 Wind 0.50 0.48 Wind 0.52 0.51
Solar 0.30 0.22 Solar 0.32 0.23 Solar 0.52 0.33 Solar 0.55 0.34
No Additional Technological 
Change
Faster Domestic Technological 
Improvements
Faster Technological 
Improvements and Delayed 
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Figure D-3 Domestic and global payoffs from reduced long-term abatement costs 
(reductions in long-term abatement costs relative to the case without near-term 
deployment policies divided by near-term costs of deployment policies) assuming that 
reference solar technologies improve four times as fast as reference wind technologies 
and advanced wind and solar technologies improve four times as fast as reference wind 
and solar technologies respectively  (see Table 3-3 for detailed assumptions). The 
circled payoffs show the Nash equilibrium under a technological change scenario. 
  
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.78 Wind 0.58 1.07 Wind 0.65 5.91 Wind 0.66 7.07
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.66 0.71 Solar 1.24 1.25 Solar 1.35 1.35
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.13 0.18 Wind 0.14 0.36 Wind 0.14 0.40
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.28 0.21 Solar 1.13 0.36 Solar 1.35 0.39
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.42 0.28 Wind 0.50 0.50 Wind 0.63 3.01 Wind 0.66 3.43
Solar 0.30 0.21 Solar 0.87 0.67 Solar 3.33 2.02 Solar 3.72 2.23
No Additional Technological 
Change
Faster Domestic Technological 
Improvements
Faster Technological 
Improvements and Delayed 
Spillovers
Faster Technological 
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Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.50 0.79 Wind 0.53 0.81 Wind 0.55 1.14 Wind 0.56 1.21
Solar 0.16 0.18 Solar 0.17 0.19 Solar 0.23 0.24 Solar 0.24 0.25
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.10 0.05 Wind 0.11 0.06 Wind 0.12 0.07 Wind 0.12 0.07
Solar 0.15 0.05 Solar 0.16 0.06 Solar 0.22 0.07 Solar 0.23 0.07
Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar
Wind 0.43 0.29 Wind 0.46 0.30 Wind 0.50 0.48 Wind 0.52 0.51
Solar 0.30 0.22 Solar 0.32 0.23 Solar 0.52 0.33 Solar 0.55 0.34
No Additional Technological 
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Faster Domestic Technological 
Improvements
Faster Technological 
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